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12	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT		
13	NORTHERN DISTRIC	CT OF CALIFORNIA	
14	SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION		
15	ROBERT JACOBSEN, an individual,	Case Number C06-1905-JSW	
16 17	Plaintiff,	Hearing Date: December 4, 2009 Hearing Time: 9:00am Place: Ct. 11, Floor 19	
18	vs.) Hon. Jeffrey S. White	
19	MATTHEW KATZER, an individual, and	DEFENDANTS MATTHEW KATZER AND KAMIND	
20	KAMIND ASSOCIATES, INC., an Oregon corporation dba KAM Industries,	ASSOCIATES, INC.'S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S	
21	Defendants.	MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT	
22		<i>)</i> -	
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Case Number C 06 1905 JSW Defendants' Response in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment

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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

Summary judgment should not be granted for Plaintiff's on any of his claims. Most importantly, Plaintiff is not entitled to summary judgment on his copyright infringement claim. There is no evidence in the record (much less no factual dispute) that Defendants copied and distributed Plaintiff's original selection and arrangement in the Decoder Definition Text Files. As discussed in detail in Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff fails to distinguish between the act of copying the Decoder Definition Text Files (allowed by the Artistic License) and the act of distributing portions of those files (which is outside of the Artistic License). Plaintiff's analysis is based on the literal content of the JMRI Decoder Definition Text Files and is thus fundamentally flawed. Therefore, summary judgment for Plaintiff is improper and, in fact, summary judgment should be granted for Defendants on this claim because there is no genuine issue of material fact that Defendants did not distribute Plaintiff's original work and, alternatively, that Plaintiff did not suffer any damages.

Summary judgment is not appropriate for Plaintiff on Defendants' copyright infringement claim because Mr. Severson's (the president of QSI) deposition testimony and Plaintiff's own statements regarding JMRI's for-profit activities creates factual issues surrounding Plaintiff's license, fair use and laches defenses.

Summary judgment is also not appropriate on Plaintiff's cyber-squatting claim because an issue of fact exists whether (1) Plaintiff is the owner of the trademark, and (2) whether Defendants acted in bad faith. Finally, summary judgment is inappropriate on Plaintiff's DMCA claim because issues exist whether Defendants did distribute false copyright information and whether Plaintiff used "technological measures performed by automated systems" to protect his copyright material as required by the DMCA.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES TO BE DECIDED

- 1. Does a genuine issue of material fact exist as to whether Plaintiff is the owner of decoderpro.com and whether Defendants acted in bad faith in registering the domain name?
- 2. Does a genuine issue of material fact exist as to whether Defendants distributed Plaintiff's copyrighted works?
- 3. Does Plaintiff have a license to use the QSI material?
- 4. Was Plaintiff's use of the QSI material fair?
- 5. Is Defendants' counterclaim barred by laches?
- 6. Does a genuine issue of material fact exist as to whether Defendants removed copyright management information as that term is defined by the DMCA?

ARGUMENT

I. PLAINTIFF HAS NOT ESTABLISHED HE IS THE OWNER OF THE TRADEMARK DECODERPRO.COM OR THAT DEFENDANTS ACTED IN BAD FAITH

A genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Plaintiff is the trademark owner of the mark decoderpro.com. Under the Lanham Act only the "trademark owner" can assert a claim under the Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act ("ACPA"). 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A); see also Bosley Med. Inst., Inc. v. Kremer, 403 F.3d 672, 681 (9th Cir. 2004).

Here, Plaintiff states that he is the trademark owner of decoderpro.com citing only to his registration of the mark. Declaration of Robert Jacobsen in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment [Dkt.#345] ("Jacobsen Decl.") ¶ 1, Ex. A. However, registration is not proof of ownership of the mark. An issue of fact exists because Plaintiff, previously, has stated that he is, at best, only a co-owner of the mark. See Second Amended Complaint ("Complaint") at ¶ 356 ("Defendant Katzer knew DecoderPro…belonged to the JMRI Project"); Complaint at ¶ 494 ("Jacobsen and the JMRI Project are the owners of the trademark DECODERPRO."). There is

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nothing in the record to indicate that the JMRI Project, who is not a Plaintiff in this action, has assigned its ownership rights to Jacobsen. Therefore, a genuine issue of material fact exists as to ownership of the mark and summary judgment is not appropriate on Plaintiff's cybersquatting claim at this time.

Assuming that Plaintiff can prove ownership, Defendants concede that all of the other elements to prove a cybersquatting claim are met, with the exception of Defendants' bad faith intent to profit from the mark. A genuine issue of material fact exists as to this element. Defendants admit that they did register the site. Declaration of Matthew Katzer in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (hereinafter "Katzer Decl"), ¶ 5. However, Defendants never put the site on-line and never offered any commercial product to the public via the site. Katzer Decl., ¶6. Additionally, Defendants never "had to relinquish rights in decoderpro.com to a third party" as Plaintiff alleges. Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (hereinafter "Pl.'s Motion") at 3. Rather, JMRI member Jerry Britton registered KAM's trademark domain name computerdispatcherpro.com in retaliation of Defendants' registration of decoderpro.com. Katzer Decl., ¶ 7. Britton advertised JMRI product on the computerdispatcherpro.com site. Katzer Decl., ¶ 7. Defendants sued Britton to recover the domain name. Katzer Decl. ¶ 9. The settlement agreement terms basically provide that KAM and JMRI member Britton will swap domain names. Decl. of Hall [Dkt.#348], Ex. J, page 5.

Plaintiff had full knowledge of all of Mr. Britton's activities on behalf of JMRI and did not discourage them. See Declaration of Scott Jerger ("Jerger Decl."), Ex 1, pages 1-2 (emails between Jerry Britton and Plaintiff). Plaintiff, during the pendency of this lawsuit, has encouraged Britton to find a lawyer to pursue Katzer, and even performed unsolicited research on potential attorneys for Britton to engage to pursue Katzer. See Jerger Decl., Ex 1, pages 3-4. Given the history of the domain disputes and the actions of both parties in regard to this, a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Defendants registered the domain name with bad faith, or at the very least whether Plaintiff's actions mitigate Defendants' actions.

II. COPYING IS NOT INFRINGEMENT AND DEFENDANTS DID NOT DISTRIBUTE ANY OF PLAINTIFF'S ORIGINAL WORKS

Defendants agree with Plaintiff that a copyright registration raises the presumption of copyright validity and ownership. Pl.'s Motion at 6. However, as discussed in Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendants have successfully rebutted this presumption by demonstrating that Plaintiff's work is not original. Defendants' copying of the Decoder Definition Text Files did not exceed the scope of the Artistic License and therefore cannot lead to copyright infringement. Defendants' modification and distribution of component parts of the Decoder Definition Text Files does not lead to copyright infringement either, because these component parts are not original to Plaintiff. Plaintiff has presented nothing in his present motion to the contrary. Plaintiff's argument is, essentially, that Defendants copied (1) Plaintiff's selection of a limited number of decoders from the world of approximately 500 decoders and (2) that Defendants copied Plaintiff's user interface, format and design. As discussed below, neither of these propositions are true, and at the very least an issue of material fact exists as to whether Defendants' product contains Plaintiff's original work. Therefore summary judgment for Plaintiff is improper.

A. KAM did not copy JMRI's selection of decoders

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants stole Plaintiff's selection of decoders in its software product. Plaintiff alleges that Version 1.7.1 of the Decoder Definition Text Files "contained 102 decoder definition files defining 291 decoders" out of a possible 500 decoders available in the market. Pl.'s Motion at 7. Plaintiff claims a copyright right in this selection of 291 out of a possible 500 decoders. While Defendants concede that they downloaded the literal versions of the Decoder Definition Text Files contained in Version 1.7.1 (including the 291 decoder selections), Defendants did not distribute this selection of the decoders contained in the JMRI work. Rather, Version 304 of Decoder Commander (which incorporated components of Version 1.7.1 of the Decoder Definition Text Files) contains definition files for 107 decoders, not 291

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decoders. Katzer Decl. ¶ 12. Plaintiff's "selection" of decoders was not copied by Defendants since Defendants used only a subset of Plaintiff's selection (107 out of 291); and therefore has no infringing act has been committed by Defendants. See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S., 348, 350 (1991).

В. Plaintiff does claim rights in the "raw data" of manufacturers

Plaintiff argues that Defendants' focus on "raw data" is a red herring. Pl.'s Motion at 8. Defendants' confusion regarding Plaintiff's copyright claim stems from Plaintiff's own inability to articulate his copyright infringement claim. When asked specifically what Plaintiff was asserting Defendants were infringing, Plaintiff stated "[t]he entire factual content of [one of the decoder definition text files]." Declaration of Matthew Katzer in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment [Dkt.#353], Ex. 3, page 27.

Regardless, Defendants have addressed in detail how Plaintiff's "selection and arrangement" was not distributed by Defendants as discussed in Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. As discussed in Defendants' Motion, it is Plaintiff's failure to distinguish between the separate acts of copying and distribution that leads to much of this confusion. Plaintiff asserts in his Motion that Plaintiff "objects only to the wholesale literal copying of the selection and arrangement of such data from JMRI's Decoder Definition Files to KAM's Decoder Commander program." Pl.'s Motion at 8. As Defendants have pointed out, the wholesale literal copying of the Decoder Definition Text Files is allowed under Plaintiff's license and cannot lead to infringement. Defendants' distributed Decoder Commander product does not contain Plaintiff's literal work, nor does it contain any of Plaintiff's original selection and arrangement and thus cannot lead to infringement.

Additionally, even Plaintiff's own most recent declaration asserts that JMRI authored the feature phrases (i.e. "Directional Headlight+Directional Mars Light") that originate from the QSI manual, discussed more *infra*. Jacobsen Decl. [Dkt#345], ¶ 48.

C. Defendants Computer Program and Interface is original

Plaintiff asserts that Defendants copied the "intuitive interface" and organization of Plaintiff's computer program. Pl.'s Motion at 9-12. It bears repeating that Defendants only copied Plaintiff's Decoder Definition Text Files and not any of Plaintiff's architecture, interface or executable computer code. Katzer Decl., ¶¶ 13-14. As discussed in Defendants' Motion at 10-13, none of Plaintiff's structure, selection and arrangement in the Decoder Definition Text Files survives in Defendants' files, only the non-original information was distributed. Plaintiff's Motion fails to provide any concrete examples of any overall structure, basic vocabulary, format, or choices made by Plaintiff that Plaintiff alleges were incorporated into Defendants' software. Motion at 9-10.

Defendants interface, layout, design and architecture were developed completely independent of JMRI. Katzer Decl. ¶¶ 13-14. Defendants contracted with Robert Bouwens to create Decoder Commander. *Id.* Bouwens created the user interface and architecture of Decoder Commander based on his own work and on the work of ESU (a manufacturer) and the NMRA. Katzer Decl., ¶ 14. Defendants have the rights to use all of these materials. Katzer Decl. ¶ 15. A comparison between the ESU Lok Commander interface and the Decoder Commander interface is contained as Ex. 2 to the Declaration of Matthew Katzer submitted with these opposition papers. This comparison shows the similarity between the user interface design of the two products.

Finally, it is important to note that Defendants cannot be "vicariously liable" for any of the products it ships contrary to Plaintiff's allegations. *See* Pl.'s Motion at 12. Plaintiff's theory, apparently, is that the decoder template tool which allows customers to convert the JMRI Decoder Definition Text Files for use with Decoder Commander leads to vicarious liability. Second Amended Complaint at ¶¶ 300-307. Here again, Plaintiff fails to make the distinction

² Again, Plaintiff's focus is on the "fundamental choices" contained *in the files that Defendants copied*, rather than on Defendants' distributed work. Pl.'s Motion at 10.

between (1) copying and (2) modification and distribution of the Decoder Definition Text Files. Customers are allowed to copy the JMRI Decoder Definition Text Files under the terms of the Artistic License. Jacobsen Decl. [Dkt# 131], Ex. A at ¶1. It is only when the customers attempt to modify and distribute the programs that they would run afoul of the license, and there is no evidence in the record that any of Defendants' customers attempted to distribute any modified Decoder Definition Text Files.

Based on the above, and since a genuine issue of material fact exists, summary judgment is not appropriate for Plaintiff on his copyright infringement claim. Rather, and as discussed on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, summary judgment should be granted for Defendants' on Plaintiff's copyright infringement claim because the work distributed by Defendants is not original to Plaintiff. Alternatively, and as also discussed in Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff's copyright infringement claim should be dismissed because Plaintiff there is no genuine issue of material fact that Plaintiff did not suffer any actual damages and Plaintiff is not entitled to statutory damages as a matter of law.

III. SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS NOT APPROPRIATE ON ANY OF PLAINTIFF'S AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

A. Plaintiff did not have a license to incorporate QSI material into the Decoder Definition Text Files.

The record reflects that Plaintiff did not have permission to extensively incorporate QSI material into JMRI files as he did. At the very least a genuine issue of material fact exists and therefore summary judgment for Plaintiff is not appropriate at this time. The record does reflect that Mr. Fred Severson, the president of QSI, authorized Plaintiff to *use* the QSI data and to incorporate numerical CV values into the Decoder Definition Text Files. The record also reflects, however, that this permission did not extend to the wholesale, literal incorporation of QSI descriptive phrases into the Decoder Definition Text Files which Plaintiff is *still* claiming as his own and asserting that Defendants are infringing. *See* Jacobsen Decl. ¶ 48.

While Plaintiff would like to believe that he was granted an "implied license," unlimited

in scope, to do whatever he wished with the QSI data, this is simply not the case. Plaintiff fails to distinguish in his moving papers between incorporation of the QSI CV numerical values (which was authorized by QSI) and the wholesale incorporation of large portions of the QSI manual including feature descriptions (which was not authorized by QSI). When asked, under oath, about the "scope" of his permission, Mr. Severson clearly stated that the permission extended to incorporating CV numerical values from the QSI manual, but not the copyrighted QSI descriptive phrases:

A: It's the information that is authorized. [...]. But it's that, you know, CV13, default value is 10, you know, [...].

Q: Okay. So if they used that information, the CV values, the descriptions—

A: Not the descriptions. I didn't say anything about descriptions. I just said send this information regarding the values to put into—see, when you download a file for a new decoder, there's no description in that file. It's just CV14 equals 10, or something like that. [...].

Q: So that—so the use of these terms, the use of this information, is permitted by QSI to JMRI developers for creating decoder definitions to support QSI decoders?

A: Well, like I was saying before, what I expected JMRI to do was to take the values of the CVs that were downloaded, you know, that applied to each one of these things, all these ID numbers for instance for the sounds, and to put those into them in whatever way that they wanted to do it. [...] You know, so I didn't—I didn't—like I say, I've never seen the JMRI stuff so I don't know. And you know, frankly, when they use specific things that, you know, belong to QSI and then claim ownership on it and then sue a business associate for it, that's pretty unacceptable. Jerger Decl., Ex. 2, pages 2-5 (Excerpts of Deposition of Fred Severson, president of QSI).

Therefore, the record contains evidence that the scope of the "implied license" was limited to Plaintiff's incorporation of the CV numerical values into the Decoder Definition Text Files. And, the record also contains evidence that JMRI exceeded the scope of this license by incorporating (and claiming authorship to) QSI descriptions in the Decoder Definition Text Files. For example, in his most recent declaration, Plaintiff cites the following example as proof that Defendants' copied the JMRI Decoder Definition Text Files:

The evidence of copying in just this small area of the files includes:

- The author of the JMRI file used "and" and "+" to represent the word "and". This appears in the following choices:
- "Directional Headlight + Directional Mars Light"
- "Directional Headlight + Directional Ditch Lights"
- "Scale mph Report and Status Report"
- "Squealing Brakes + Air Brakes". Jacobsen Decl. [Dkt.# 345] in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at pages 9-10.

These descriptive phrases are the phrases Mr. Severson was referring to as the copyrighted QSI descriptive phrases; and these descriptive phrases (with the exception of "Scale mph Report and Status Report") come verbatim (including the "+" sign) from the QSI Manual. *See* Katzer Decl. [Dkt.# 353], Ex. 4. The "Scale mph report and Status Report" is a very basic abbreviation of the phrase "Scale Miles Per Hour Report and Status Report" which comes directly from the QSI Manual. Jerger Decl., Ex 4.

Finally, Plaintiff's assertions that Mr. Pruss, an employee of QSI, somehow gave the appropriate permission is unavailing. Mr. Pruss does not have the authority to grant any license on behalf of QSI. Jerger Decl., Ex. 2, Pages 6-7. Therefore, JMRI exceeded the scope of the implied license to use the QSI manual and this Court should deny Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff's license defense.

B. Plaintiff's incorporation of the QSI descriptions was unfair

Plaintiff's incorporation of the QSI descriptions is not a use that is fair under any of the factors in 17 U.S.C. § 107. First, the purpose and character of the use of the QSI descriptions was not for a nonprofit educational purpose, but rather for incorporation into Plaintiff's open source "free" software product. There are many for-profit business models which provide free software to help sell hardware (Apple, IBM) or to help sell support services (IBM, Red Hat, Sun Microsystems); therefore the fact that the software license comes free of charge is of little consequence. *See* Association of Competitive Technology, "Paying for Free: Security, Privacy, and Sustainability Costs for 'Free Software'" (June 2009), *available at*,

http://www.actonline.org/library/paying-for-free-software.html. There is nothing preventing 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13

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Plaintiff from pursuing this for-profit open source business model in the future, therefore it is inaccurate to equate open source, free software with non-profit as Plaintiff does. Additionally, the record flatly contradicts Plaintiff's assertions that he and JMRI are a not for profit venture. Plaintiff states, in his declaration, that "JMRI does not charge for its software. It has never charged in the past, and has no plans to charge for it in the future." Jacobsen Decl. [Dkt.# 345], ¶ 29. However, in a March 26, 2005 letter attempting to qualify JMRI for membership in the Model Railroad Industry Association, Plaintiff represented that:

"[JMRI does] in fact sell both directly to modelers and to dealers for resale...I can tell you that last year's sales exceeded \$5,000. We expect significant growth this year...". Jerger Decl., Ex 3.

Lastly, it is disingenuous for Plaintiff to claim that his purpose is "not for profit" when Plaintiff seeks over \$150,000 from Defendants in actual damages for copyright infringement of his works, including the OSI descriptions. Jacobsen Decl., ¶ 48; Katzer Decl., ¶ 17. Plaintiff cannot have it both ways.

The second and third factors also do not favor Plaintiff. Plaintiff states that the programmers that assigned him copyright rights to their work only used a "tiny fraction" of the QSI copyrighted work. Pl.'s Motion at 17. The fact that Defendants only incorporated a "tiny fraction" of Plaintiff's data into their Decoder Commander product has never blunted Plaintiff's enthusiasm for his own copyright infringement claim against Defendants. It is not the quantity of the words, but the quality in this case. If Plaintiff can maintain a copyright infringement claim against Defendants for the selection and use of the NMRA term "Primary Address" (Jacobsen Decl. [Dkt.#345], ¶ 14-18), surely Defendants claim against Plaintiff for the use and selection of

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³ Plaintiff's damage measurement reflects only the purported value of the JMRI software, while ignoring any damage recovery for Defendants failure to attribute (i.e. reputational harm), which was the act that exceeded the license.

QSI's copyrighted description "Directional Headlight + Directional Ditch Lights" (Jacobsen Decl., ¶ 48) is on an equal footing.

The fourth factor also weights against Plaintiff. Plaintiff, out of anyone, should realize that the fact that QSI's manual is "public information" and "in the public domain" (Pl.'s Motion at 16) does not mean that QSI has waived its copyright rights. This issue has been the focus of this lawsuit for three years now and is the foundation of Plaintiff's copyright claim against Defendants. Second, it is patently untrue that Plaintiff's use of the QSI descriptions "benefited QSI." Pl.'s Motion at 16. Mr. Severson clearly explained the problem with Plaintiff's use of his work:

Q: If [JMRI's use is] a concern of yours, why didn't you contact Bob to make arrangements?

A: Because he sued a business associate over stuff that I wrote. For crying out loud, I mean, all of a sudden I hear about this thing out of the blue. All of the sudden I got—I mean, Microsoft would drop me like a hot potato if they didn't think that I had ownership of my own copyrighted material. They won't talk to people that don't own their stuff, if there's any issues about it whatsoever. And this is an issue. This is a big issue. Jerger Decl., Ex 2, pages 8-9.

Contrary to Plaintiff's assertions, Plaintiff's use of the QSI works does harm

Defendants and QSI *qua* this lawsuit and the damages that Plaintiff seeks from Defendants are for works based, in part, on QSI's copyrighted feature descriptions. See Jacobsen Decl.

[Dkt#345], ¶ 48. Therefore, Plaintiff's use of the QSI materials had a negative effect on QSI, Defendants, and the entire model train industry.

C. Defendants' Counterclaim is not Inequitable

Defendants have not "slept on their rights" and there has been no delay that has prejudiced Plaintiff. Defendants bought the rights to the QSI manual in November 2006.

Defendants did not "inform" Plaintiff of the assignment because Defendants (and QSI) are more

concerned with protecting the intellectual property rights of QSI than obtaining money damages from Plaintiff. Mr. Severson made this clear in this deposition:

Q: You said you expected a contractual-some sort of contractual negotiations to be started?

A: A phone call, an e-mail, something. I didn't get anything.

Q: You did. A: I got something from you. I got something from him here towards the—you know, towards, the 11th hour after Matt got sued. Then I got something.

Q: And you didn't respond.

any of the allegedly infringing material.

A: No. At that point, are you kidding me? Now I'm in situation where I've got to establish ownership of my copyrighted material. We're already in a lawsuit. Matt is already in a lawsuit. I'm not going to sue Bob Jacobsen over this and spend a lot of money when I can establish this thing in court in another route. Jerger Decl., Ex 2, pages 10-11.

Defendants delay does not prejudice Plaintiff because Defendant's are not seeking damages from Plaintiff based on Plaintiff's distribution of software containing QSI work. Rather, Defendants believe that the correct measure of damages, as discussed in Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment at page 20, is what a willing buyer would have been reasonably required to pay to a willing seller for the work, or, in other words, the value of an imputed license. *See Frank Music Corp.*, v. Metro Goldwyn-Mayer, 772 F.2d 505, 512 (9th Cir. 1985). Lastly, it is inaccurate for Plaintiff to claim that his use of the QSI work would have "stopped immediately" if only Defendants or QSI had objected to the use of the work. Pl.'s Motion at 18. Defendants counterclaim was filed on February 11, 2009 and, to date, Plaintiff has not removed

IV. SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS NOT APPROPRIATE ON PLAINTIFF'S DMCA CLAIM

As discussed on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, summary judgment should be granted for Defendants on Plaintiff's DMCA claim since Defendants did not distribute a copyrightable work and therefore cannot be liable for concurrently distributing false copyright management information. At the very least, a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Defendants distributed a copyrightable work with false copyright management information.

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Alternatively, a hybrid factual/legal issue exists as to whether Plaintiff's "script" which inserted a copyright notice in each Decoder Definition Text File (Jacobsen Decl. [Dkt#345], ¶ 37) was a technological measure of an automated copyright protection or management system entitled to protection under the DMCA. The DMCA only protects copyright management information "performed by the technological measures of automated systems." *IQ Group, Ltd.*, v. Wiesner Pub., LLC, 409 F.Supp.2d 587, 598 (D. N.J. 2006). There is no evidence in the record that Plaintiff's "script" meets this requirement and Plaintiff's motion fails to address this issue. Therefore, summary judgment for Plaintiff should not be granted on the DMCA claim.

CONCLUSION

Based on the above, Defendants respectfully request that this Court deny Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment in its entirety because genuine issues of material fact exist and

Dated November 13, 2009.

Plaintiff is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Respectfully submitted,

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on November 13, 2009, I served Matthew Katzer's and KAM's RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT on the following parties through their attorneys via the Court's ECF filing system:

Victoria K. Hall Attorney for Robert Jacobsen Law Office of Victoria K. Hall 3 Bethesda Metro Suite 700 Bethesda, MD 20814 David McGowan Warren Hall 5998 Alcala Park San Diego, CA 92110

/s/ Scott Jerger

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