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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Defendants raise no arguments that defeat Jacobsen's motion for preliminary injunction. Jacobsen is likely to succeed on the merits. Irreparable injury exists. The balance of the equities favors Jacobsen. Defendants do not contest that the public interest favors Jacobsen.

After Jacobsen filed his motion, the U.S. Supreme Court issued <u>Winter v. Natural Res. Def.</u> <u>Council, Inc.</u>, No. 07-1239, 555 U.S. ___, slip op. at 12 (U.S. Nov. 12, 2008), which rejected the Ninth Circuit's "possibility of irreparable injury" standard. Under <u>Winter</u>,

a plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable injury in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of the equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.

Slip op. at 10. Even under this standard, Jacobsen is still entitled to a preliminary injunction.

Jacobsen is likely to succeed on the merits. Defendants conceded Jacobsen owned the copyright. JMRI developers coded variable selection, naming, and arrangement in their works. Defendants copied that in more than 100 files, and still do in QSI and Lenz files. Jacobsen has shown that Defendants exercised his exclusive rights, and Jacobsen defeated their license argument. <u>Jacobsen v. Katzer</u>, 535 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Jacobsen will succeed.

Irreparable injury exists and, as Defendants conceded on appeal, damages are inadequate. The threat of future infringement exists. Jacobsen has found JMRI-specific variable names in Defendants' version 312. Defendants have not proven they independently created their new works. They could have produced the evidence, but they chose not to. Because Defendants refuse to offer evidence in their possession, this Court should resolve these facts against them.

The equities favor Jacobsen. If the injunction does not issue, Jacobsen could face years of continued infringement with inadequate damages to compensate for the injury. An infringer cannot complain about hardship that he may suffer as a result of being ordered to stop his intentional infringement, but Defendants nevertheless complain. Equity does not recognize their complaints.

Finally, the injunction is definite enough for Defendants to follow—especially Defendants who claim not to use JMRI materials.

Jacobsen will succeed. The injury is irreparable and real. The injunction should issue.

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Jacobsen respectfully submits this Reply memorandum in response to Defendants' Second Corrected Opposition [Docket #264] to Jacobsen's Motion for Preliminary Injunction.

I. INTRODUCTION

Defendants contend that Jacobsen has not shown a likelihood of success on the merits, and has not shown irreparable injury. They contend that they will suffer hardship.

Defendants are wrong. Jacobsen will prevail. The Federal Circuit decision acknowledged irreparable injury. Equity does not consider the harm caused to an infringer who is ordered to stop. For these and other reasons, the Court should order the preliminary injunction to issue.

II. PROCEDURE

After his demands that Defendants halt their copyright infringement were met with silence, Jacobsen moved for a preliminary injunction on October 25, 2006 to enjoin the infringement. Motion for Preliminary Injunction [Docket # 114]. The Court heard argument on January 19, 2007, and denied the motion on August 17, 2007. Order Granting Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendants' Motion to Strike, and Denying Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction [hereinafter District Court's Aug. 17, 2007 order] [Docket #158] at 8-11. The Court stated that terms in the Artistic License were covenants, not conditions, and thus, Jacobsen's remedy lay in contract law, not copyright law. <u>Id.</u> at 10-11.

Jacobsen appealed. On August 13, 2008, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit vacated this Court's order, finding that terms in the Artistic License were conditions that limited the scope of the license grant. <u>Jacobsen v. Katzer</u>, 535 F.3d 1373, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2008). The Federal Circuit remanded the matter to this Court to make findings of fact on whether Jacobsen had shown likelihood of success on the merits, and whether Jacobsen was entitled to a presumption of irreparable harm or had to demonstrate irreparable harm. <u>Id.</u> at 1382-83.

On remand, this Court ordered the parties to update their motions to reflect the current state of the law. Amended Minute Entry [Docket # 229]. Jacobsen updated his motion for preliminary injunction to include a motion based on 17 U.S.C. Sec. 1202, and filed the updated motion on October 3, 2008. Motion for Preliminary Injunction [Docket #230]. Defendants filed an original Opposition and two corrected Oppositions on November 7, 2008. Defendants Matthew Katzer and

KAMIND Associates, Inc.'s Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction [Dockets #260, 263, 264]¹. In addition to denying irreparable injury and pleading hardship, Defendants contested likelihood of success on the merits of copyright infringement, but not Sec. 1202.

Meanwhile, the United States Supreme Court on November 12, 2008 issued a ruling overturning the Ninth Circuit's standard for a preliminary injunction. Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., No. 07-1239, 555 U.S. __, slip op. at 12 (U.S. Nov. 12, 2008) (rejecting the "possibility of irreparable injury" standard). Under Winter,

a plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable injury in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of the equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.

Slip op. at 10.

Jacobsen addresses the stricter standard in this Reply memorandum, in addition to responding to Defendants' Second Corrected Opposition [Docket #264].

III. FACTS

In its ruling, the Federal Circuit recognized the bargain between open source groups and their downstream users: users may download and use the software within the terms of the license. <u>Jacobsen</u>, 535 F.3d at 1382. Open source groups suffer irreparable harm when users like Defendants infringe or encourage others to infringe copyrighted open source works. <u>See id.</u> at 1382 & 1383 n.6. Open source groups rely upon the terms of their licenses for several reasons: (1) to drive traffic to their website, (2) to ensure compliance with license terms, (3) to gain further contributors to improve their software, and (4) to increase their reputation. The Federal Circuit found that these constitute an economic interest, albeit a non-traditional interest. <u>See id.</u> at 1382.

This interest may be impossible to value. Defendants conceded this during oral argument at the Federal Circuit:

¹ In Defendants' original Opposition, Defendants asked this Court to reconsider their mootness arguments which both this Court and the Federal Circuit rejected. Defendants also argued that an

injunction was not in the public interest. Defendants removed these arguments from the Second Corrected Opposition to comply with this Court's 15-page limit. Jacobsen does not address them.

1 2	Judge Hochberg: So you're basically saying it's a covenant, therefore only damages would be available, [Ms. Hall] can't prove any damages, so "Too bad, so sad." Is that basically the argument?
3	Mr. Jerger: That is the legal position, yes.
4	Judge Hochberg: That's what I thought.
5	[]
6	Judge Hochberg: I understand your argument, but, what your argument is saying in
7	essence is that these conditions have no way to enforce them. If they're not capable of being quantified in damages terms, so you can't get damages for their breach if they're covenants, and you argue they're not conditions, then they're meaningless, is what you're saying.
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9	Mr. Jerger: Well, to the extent that they can prove damages under breach of contract
10	Judge Hochberg: I just took damages out of it because a moment ago I asked you
11	the question and you said no [Ms. Hall] can't, you agreed with me, [Ms. Hall] can't prove damages.
12	Mr. Jerger: Well, if they can't prove damages, then I would agree with you that
13	Judge Hochberg: They're meaningless. That's what your position is.
14	Mr. Jerger: Yes.
15	Oral argument, <u>Jacobsen v. Katzer</u> , No. 2008-1001 [hereinafter Oral argument], at 22:52-23:04 &
16	26:05-:48, <u>available at http://oralarguments.cafc.uscourts.gov/mp3/2008-1001.mp3</u> (recorded May
17	7, 2008). Stepping away from their concession, Defendants now contend that the \$1200 that they
18	have earned from their software is sufficient compensation to Jacobsen for (1) the three and a half
19	years of infringement they, their distributors, and their users engaged in, (2) two and a half years of
20	contentious litigation, including an appeal that involved 6 amicus groups and resulted in an
21	appellate ruling that completely repudiated Defendants' position, and (3) ongoing infringement.
22	For the following reasons, it is not sufficient.
23	Katzer has engaged in a pattern of copying. He admits copying JMRI files in early 2005.
24	Declaration of Matthew Katzer [hereinafter Katzer Decl.] at ¶ 7. He also copied again in summer
25	2005 in order to obtain the QSI files from JMRI. <u>See</u> Declaration of Robert Jacobsen [hereinafter
26	Jacobsen Decl.] at ¶¶ 71-72. He copied all content except the copyright notice and the authors'
27	names. <u>Id.</u> at ¶ 72 (last bullet). Katzer knew about DecoderPro since May 2003 and knew about

Katzer misrepresents what he copied. Katzer describes what he took as manufacturer data,

unauthorized copying at least twice and he knew about the requirements of the license when he

Katzer Decl. at ¶ 8, but it is more than that. Katzer copied JMRI's selection, naming conventions,

and arrangement. Jacobsen Decl. at ¶ 71-73. JMRI developers identified and selected variables to

include in the Decoder Definition Files. Id. at ¶ 17-32. Variable names come from a variety of

began his unauthorized copying.

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No. C-06-1905-JSW

Katzer intentionally removed copyright management information. Katzer said that he left out the copyright notice and the reference to the license on accident because it was in a comment field, Katzer Decl. at ¶ 13, but he declined to put his program code for the infringing tool into evidence. The facts show the removal was intentional. In order to convert JMRI files to KAM files, Katzer had to review JMRI files to determine what he wanted and what he didn't want. Supplemental Declaration of Robert Jacobsen [hereinafter Jacobsen Supp. Decl.] at ¶¶ 1-8. Katzer didn't want the top lines, the comment fields, in JMRI files, which had the copyright notices and the reference to the license. He had to create a program that recognized those lines and skipped over them. Id. at ¶¶ 3-8. Katzer didn't want the author's name, which is not in a comment field. In order to copy the date and version number, Katzer's copying program had to read the entire line of text, skip over the author's name, and pluck out the date and version number to copy it to

Katzer attempted to expand the number of infringers by urging the National Model Railroad Association to adopt his infringing template for all to use. See Katzer Decl. at ¶ 12. After twice making unauthorized copies of JMRI content, and then distributing his infringing product, Katzer spearheaded an effort to get the NMRA to develop and adopt a standard for decoder definitions and suggested his own format. See id. Katzer claimed that he had his own decoder definitions, which were in his Decoder Command product, and hid from the NMRA that he had copied his content from JMRI. See Jacobsen Decl. at ¶ 50, Ex. V. No JMRI developer was involved or

Katzer's files. Id. at ¶¶ 6-7. Katzer had to write the copying program to leave out the author's

name. Id. at ¶ 7. Therefore, Katzer intended to remove the copyright management information.

supported Katzer's effort. Jacobsen Supp. Decl. at ¶ 9. Katzer's effort to get the NMRA to standardize decoder definitions took place years after JMRI started distributing its Decoder Definition Files, and months after Katzer himself had created and distributed his copy of JMRI content. Contrary to what Katzer says, there is no evidence that JMRI's Decoder Definition Files "built on the effort to construct a master, uniform template of manufacturer's specification data." Id. Katzer undertook that effort personally after he had committed infringement.

Unrepentant, Katzer claims he has a right to engage in his infringing activities. See Katzer Decl. at ¶¶ 48-52. As an excuse for his continued copying, Katzer states that he has a copyright assignment to the QSI manual, which he obtained after Jacobsen registered his copyright, and thus the assignment gives him the right to continue copying JMRI's QSI file. Id. at ¶ 48. Katzer points to some variables that appear in both works, id. at ¶ 51 & Exs. F-AO, but fails to identify the other variables present in the JMRI work that are not in the QSI manual. Jacobsen Supp. Decl. at ¶¶ 11-17. Katzer also fails to identify that the QSI files—6 of them—are subsets of QSI variables, and that these subsets were chosen based on selection criteria related to the train function they were emulating. Id. at ¶ 11. Katzer argues that his license to the QSI manual entitles him to all the separate creation expressed in JMRI's QSI files—the variable selection, naming, and arrangement, Katzer Decl. at ¶ 52, for which he does not have a license, Jacobsen Supp. Decl. ¶ 18. In addition, Katzer also does not explain how he had the right to copy 101 other JMRI files or how he has a right to copy JMRI's Lenz file, a variation of which was in Katzer's version 312. Id.

Katzer claims he has halted all infringement, Katzer Decl. at ¶¶ 15-19, 26, but he declines to put the proof into evidence, even though it is in his possession. Katzer says that he has recalled all infringing versions of his software, id. at ¶ 15, but he provides no evidence of a recall letter or email. Jacobsen has not received any recall notices, and still has his KAM software copies. Jacobsen Supp. Decl. at ¶¶ 21-23. Katzer has done nothing to halt the infringing tool from running. <u>Id.</u> at ¶ 23. KAM users can still create infringing KAM templates from JMRI files. <u>Id.</u>

Katzer makes various claims about how he will never infringe again, Katzer Decl. at ¶¶ 17-22, 24, but he never shows any evidence of independent creation, even though this evidence, if it exists, is in his possession. Katzer says that his newer versions are incompatible with JMRI, and

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therefore, he will never again infringe. Id. at ¶¶ 18-21. However, Katzer's earlier versions were technically incompatible with JMRI, and Katzer was still able to copy JMRI content into them, thus infringing Jacobsen's copyright. Jacobsen Suppl. Decl. at ¶ 19. Katzer then says he is using different technology for his decoder definitions, and that this technology is more expensive and incompatible with JMRI. Katzer Decl. at ¶ 18-19. But this is irrelevant. Katzer could have copied JMRI content to the new technology format. Jacobsen Supp. Decl at ¶ 19. Katzer states that the decoder definitions are not required to start up Decoder Commander. Katzer Decl. at ¶ 11. This is irrelevant. Decoder Commander may be able to initiate, but it cannot program a decoder without some form of a decoder definition, whether from JMRI or another source, in a definition file or a database. Jacobsen Supp. Decl. at ¶ 20. Katzer says KAM versions 304 and 305 no longer work, but Jacobsen was able to get both to start and display infringing content. <u>Id.</u> at ¶¶ 22-23. If Katzer had created the new decoder definitions independently, he could have offered the evidence, but he does not. He could have offered his database structure and content into evidence, but he does not. If he has concerns about its confidentiality and wanted it to be sealed, he had 5 weeks to do so, but chose not to. Instead of producing any evidence of independently created new decoder definitions, Katzer employs confusing and irrelevant arguments to distract attention from the issue.

Katzer claims he has no motive to infringe, saying that he never knew his product was going to be compared to JMRI in Model Railroad News, Katzer Decl. at ¶ 25—but the evidence shows otherwise. Model Railroad News announced in 2006 that it was reviewing model railroad software. Jacobsen Supp. Decl. at ¶ 26. In order to have the software reviewed, the software producer had to contact Model Railroad News. Id. Katzer did that, because his name appears on the list. See id. at ¶ 27. Along with Jacobsen, Katzer received emails from Model Railroad News regarding the reviews. Id. Also, Model Railroad News is the only publication that Katzer still advertises in. Id. at ¶ 28. Katzer knew about the upcoming reviews and that his software would be compared with JMRI's software. Because Katzer's software does not have the range of features that JMRI's has, Katzer's software risked being reviewed unfavorably. So, Katzer has motive to use JMRI materials to increase the range of features.

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Katzer maintains that if the injunction issues, KAMIND Associates, Inc. will go out of business. Katzer Decl. at ¶ 36.2 Katzer now says that a never-before-disclosed unidentified "Company" is willing to do business with him, but that it will be "scared" away if the injunction issues. Id. at ¶ 41. Katzer provides no evidence of what the company's name is or any records to support his assertions. Katzer says "Company" is "litigation adverse", id. at ¶ 38, but Katzer's litigation tactics of suing competitors' wives, Katzer v. Mireille S. Tanner³, did not scare "Company" away. Katzer's tactics of sending intrusive, accusation-laden FOIA requests⁴ to his competitor's government employer also did not scare "Company" away. Katzer's accusations of patent infringement, made without a factual foundation, also have not scared "Company" from engaging in talks with Katzer. Katzer's wholesale repudiation of licenses (Artistic License and GPL) also did not scare "Company" away from starting contractual negotiations with Katzer. Katzer's bad faith registration of others' intellectual property—and transfer with a penalty of \$20,000 and attorneys fees —that also did not scare "Company". But an injunction ordering Katzer to meet his obligations under the Artistic License—according to Katzer, that injunction will scare "Company" away.

In short, Katzer says he's stopped infringing, and that he will be injured if the injunction issues. Katzer could have produced documentary evidence to support his claims. If the evidence existed, it was in Katzer's possession. Katzer didn't produce the evidence—because it's either adverse or it doesn't exist.

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² Compare Katzer's earlier statements about KAMIND's solvency. Declaration of Matthew Katzer in Support of Defendants Response in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction [Docket # 124, Attachment #1] at ¶ 3 ("KAM is adequately capitalized…")

³ <u>Katzer v. Mireille S. Tanner</u>, No. CV-02-1293-ST (filed Sept. 18, 2002), Request for Judicial Notice in Support of Opposition to Motion to Dismiss for Mootness [Docket #246], Ex. I.

⁴ Defendants' FOIA Request, Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Mootness, Affidavit of Robert Jacobsen in Support of Opposition [Docket #213], Ex. E.

⁵ <u>See</u> Declaration of Kevin Russell Supporting Reply to Plaintiff's Opposition Brief [Docket #254] at ¶¶ 3, 6 (admitting that he had done no claim construction or factual investigation prior to making his accusations, but that he was going to make accusations of patent infringement anyway).

⁶ <u>See Jacobsen v. Britton</u>, No. D2007-0763 (WIPO July 26, 2007) (describing Katzer's bad faith registration of decoderpro.com, and transfer to Jerry Britton). Second Motion for Leave to File Supplementary Material [Docket #156], App. A at 7-9.

IV. ARGUMENT

The preliminary injunction should issue. Under Winter,

a plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable injury in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of the equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.

Slip op. at 10. Jacobsen has shown earlier a likelihood of success, irreparable harm, inadequate damages, the balance of the equities favors him, as does the public interest. In their Second Corrected Opposition, Defendants do not contest that the public interest favors Jacobsen. Defendants' other new arguments do not change the result. They do not challenge Jacobsen's arguments relating to 17 U.S.C. Sec. 1202. This Court should issue the preliminary injunction.

A. <u>Jacobsen Has Shown Likelihood of Success on the Merits</u>

Jacobsen has shown a likelihood of success on the merits. He is the copyright holder, which Defendants conceded. <u>Jacobsen</u>, 535 F.3d at 1379. Jacobsen has also shown that Defendants exercised his exclusive rights in a manner that was outside the scope of the license. <u>Id.</u> at 1383. Jacobsen defeated Defendants' license theory. <u>See id.</u> Therefore, Jacobsen has shown a likelihood of success on the merits.

Although bound by his concession, Katzer newly raises an argument—lack of ownership, a defense was available to him in November 2006—which Katzer maintains will show that Jacobsen will not succeed on the merits. For the following reasons, this argument fails.

Katzer claims to own the JMRI QSI files because, after being accused of infringement and after Jacobsen's registration, he worked out a deal with the owners of QSI Industries in November 2006 for an exclusive license to a QSI manual. Assuming the QSI-KAM transfer is valid, the copyrights are different. The QSI Manual copyright is a reference manual to assist QSI decoder owners in programming their chips. Given away free, the QSI Manual is primarily instructional text. This text is not available in JMRI decoder definition files. The JMRI QSI decoder definitions—6 of them, which are subsets of variables in the QSI manuals and include variable names from other sources—result in a screen display showing radio buttons, check boxes, sliding scales, etc., to make it easier for decoder owners to program their chips. These screens, and the

specific variable selection, naming, arrangement, and setting, are not present in the QSI manual. They are a compilation covered by JMRI's copyright, see Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345, 350 (1991); Key Publ'ns, Inc. v. China Today Publ'g Enters., Inc., 945 F.2d 509, 513 (2d Cir. 1991), and are distinctly different from Katzer's copyright, which is not a compilation. Katzer copied all of JMRI's variable selection, naming, and arrangement from all 6 QSI files. In his declaration, Katzer cherry-picked variables from the JMRI QSI files for his comparison, and intentionally did not show the other non-QSI manual variable names. A review of the variables in Katzer's exhibits shows that JMRI developers took variable names from a range of sources, and also created their own variable names. Jacobsen Supp. Decl. at ¶¶ 12-17. Katzer, in no way, shows how the JMRI files lack creativity in selection. Thus, his arguments fail and the variable selection is covered by Jacobsen's copyright.

Thus, Jacobsen has shown a likelihood of success on the merits.

B. <u>Jacobsen Has Shown Irreparable Harm</u>

Jacobsen has suffered irreparable harm, and shown that it will likely continue. A preliminary injunction may only be granted when the moving party has demonstrated a significant threat of irreparable injury, irrespective of the magnitude of that injury. Simula, Inc. v. Autoliv, Inc., 175 F.3d 716, 725 (9th Cir. 1999). Damage to an intangible, such as goodwill, recruitment efforts, or the right to exclude when the owner does not regularly license work, results in irreparable injury. Rent-a-Center, Inc. v. Canyon Television & Appliance Rental, Inc., 944 F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 1991). See eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 395 (2006) (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (in patent case, addressing the difficulty in protecting a right to exclude through monetary damages when the use is against the patent holder's wishes). When the nature of a plaintiff's loss may make it difficult to value, or if an infringer is likely to become insolvent, damages are inadequate. In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, Human Rights Litig., 25 F.3d 1467, 1479 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Roland Mach. Co. v. Dresser Indus., 749 F.2d 380, 386 (7th Cir. 1984)). Defendants have repeatedly violated Jacobsen's right to exclude. They are not complying with the license terms. Because of Defendants' infringement, Jacobsen is losing contributors who would have otherwise known about the JMRI project, and would have contributed to it.

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Furthermore, KAMIND Associates asserts it is teetering on the verge of insolvency, which may make it difficult, if not impossible, for Jacobsen to collect. Damages are inadequate and irreparable harm has been shown.

This irreparable harm is likely to continue. Defendants have offered no proof of independent creation, although that proof is within their control. A court may resolve facts against a party who refuses to provide evidence under his control. Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 89 n.63 (1974). It is appropriate to do so here. Next, Katzer's argument that he is confused about what he should not copy, negates his earlier statements that he is no longer using JMRI materials. That aside, Defendants have shown a pattern of misappropriating others' intellectual property. The existence of past violations may give rise to an inference there will be future violations. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 518 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1221 (C.D. Cal. 2007). In Jacobsen v. Britton, a WIPO panel faulted Katzer for his bad faith registration of decoderpro.com. Two patent examiners have found that Defendants claimed as their own invention, the work of another competitor, DigiToys. When an infringer offers "thin excuses" when confronted with his conduct, the threat of future infringement is inferred. Designer Skin, LLC v. S & L Vitamins, Inc., No. CV 05-3699-PHX-JAT, 2008 WL 4174882, at *5 (D.Ariz. Sept. 5, 2008). Katzer knew of the license and its terms. He is familiar with open source groups and their software development model. He took JMRI materials anyway and chose not to follow any of the terms. In his defense, he says that he "didn't think" Jacobsen would be "upset" by his actions—an absurd excuse. Katzer is not sorry he infringed—he is sorry that he was caught. All of these, coupled with KAMIND's potential insolvency, show that Jacobsen is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of an injunction.

This Court should issue the injunction.

C. Balance of Equities Tips in Jacobsen's Favor

The balance of the equities favors Jacobsen. Equity does not recognize the harm that an infringer will suffer from being forced to stop his wrongdoing. Concrete Machinery Co. v. Classic

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⁷ <u>See</u> Plaintiff Robert Jacobsen's Request for Judicial Notice in Support of Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Mootness, Ex D at 4, Ex. G at 4-6.

<u>Lawn Ornaments, Inc.</u>, 843 F.2d 600, 612 (1st Cir. 1988). Indeed, once a copyright holder has shown a likelihood of success on the merits, the hardship caused from a lack of an injunction tip sharply in its favor. <u>Id.</u> Lack of an injunction will impose hardship on Jacobsen, but a grant of injunction will cause no hardship to Defendants that the law recognizes.

1. Jacobsen Will Suffer Hardship If the Injunction Does Not Issue

Unless this Court stops Defendants, Jacobsen risks having his works infringed through this litigation with inadequate damages to compensate for it. Defendants have shown a pattern of misconduct. They refuse to provide documentary evidence to show that this infringement has stopped. The equities strongly favor Jacobsen.

2. <u>Defendants Do Not Suffer Any Hardship—Except that Which They Inflicted Upon Themselves</u>

Knowing he was violating JMRI's license, Katzer infringed Jacobsen's copyrights and took a chance that he would be caught. He lost. Balancing the equities is inappropriate when a defendant intentionally infringes a copyright. See Louis W. Epstein Family P'ship v. Kmart Corp., 13 F.3d 762, 769-70 (3d Cir. 1994) (in easement case, balancing the equities is inappropriate when a violation of easement terms is intentional). Here, Defendants do not suffer any hardship that they did not thrust upon themselves. If Defendants are continuing their infringement, then they have no basis to complain if they are ordered to stop. The equities do not favor Defendants.

Unable to find a hardship, Defendants created a new one, never before seen. Defendants claim they are in the midst of a deal with an unidentified, never-before-disclosed, "Company". They offer neither any of the business plans that support the figures they disclose, nor a declaration from the Company. Defendants claim that, if the injunction issues, they will lose an opportunity to make \$290,000/year and sell 45,000 units of software to said Company, because the Company is "litigation adverse" and afraid of Jacobsen. The Company apparently is not discouraged by Katzer's aggressive litigation tactics, nor is it concerned with Katzer's record of failing to meet his obligations. Even if "Company" really exists, the numbers Katzer state lack credibility for

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⁸ Defendants state they have stopped their use of JMRI materials. If true, then they suffer no hardship from the injunction because they can continue their work without fear of facing a contempt sanction.

Katzer's business and for model railroading. Over all these years, Katzer's gross receipts are only \$1200 on Decoder Commander. It taxes credibility that Katzer would suddenly be able to make \$290,000/year in sales on his hobby software, when he has been unable to make substantial sales before. That said, Katzer could easily resolve the problem by offering a warranty to the Company that his software has no infringing content, and offering to indemnify said Company, and pay its attorneys fees and costs, if Katzer's software is found to infringe. These are standard terms, commonly made in commercial transactions. Furthermore, even if what Defendants say is true, Defendants should have thought about the consequences before they infringed Jacobsen's copyrights. Their attempt to blame Jacobsen for their reputation problems is like the repeat shoplifter who blames his bad reputation on the store owner who pressed charges. The Court should reject Defendants' contentions that they will suffer hardship.

Katzer complains about the adverse publicity that this case has generated, and says he fears future adverse publicity. Katzer brought this on himself. After reviewing Katzer's letters, FOIA request, lawsuits, and filings, independent commentators took a dim view of Katzer's litigation tactics. If Katzer had been reasonable and agreed to a consent injunction, this matter would never have garnered the attention that it has. Katzer has no basis to complain.

D. Preliminary Injunction Terms Are Sufficiently Definite for Defendants to Obey

The terms of the preliminary injunction are sufficiently definite so that Defendants can follow them—especially, since Defendants claim they stopped using JMRI materials altogether. An injunction must be "specific in terms", Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d), but broad injunctions are warranted when Defendants, as here, blatantly violate the law. <u>Creative Computing v. Getloaded.com LLC</u>, 386 F.3d 930, 937 (9th Cir. 2004).

Katzer understands what Jacobsen has claimed. Jacobsen registered several copyrighted works. These works have version numbers. They are readily accessible on JMRI's SourceForge website, as Katzer knows since he downloaded them multiple times from there. Jacobsen also

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⁹ As to Katzer's figures, as popular as JMRI is, JMRI has only 11,000 users over the course of 8 years, thus averaging an increase of 1,500 users/year. Jacobsen Supp. Decl. at ¶ 24. This raises doubt that Defendants have realistic sales estimates.

deposited the works with the Copyright Office, so Defendants, in the alternative, can obtain them by request. Jacobsen's claim is to "new computer program and updates to existing program, compilation and selection of pre-existing data by listed authors." So Katzer knows what the copyright covers. Furthermore, if Katzer is no longer copying JMRI files, then he need not worry about violating the injunction.

Defendants cite Louis W. Epstein Family Partnership v. Kmart Corp., 13 F.3d 762 (3d Cir. 1994) for the proposition that a court cannot order the enjoined party to stop violating the law, but the case does not help Defendants. In Epstein, two family members—Louis and Morris Epstein owned a parcel, tenants in common. Id. at 764. Levitz furniture store rented a portion of the parcel. Id. Louis and Morris later divided the parcel, with Louis obtaining the portion of the parcel where Levitz was located. <u>Id.</u> at 764-65. This portion of the parcel was landlocked. <u>Id.</u> Morris and Louis signed and recorded a Declaration of Easements to ensure that tenants of Louis' parcel had ingress and egress. Id. Years later, Morris sold his portion to Kmart, which sought to develop the parcel. <u>Id.</u> Kmart's development plan violated the Declaration of Easements. <u>Id.</u> Louis brought suit, and obtained a preliminary injunction to bar Kmart, which had begun plans for the development, from taking actions that would interfere with Louis' rights. Id. However, the preliminary injunction also restricted Kmart from all future violations of the Declaration of Easements. Id. The Third Circuit found that term to be overly broad, especially since Kmart had the right to use the parcel, and had violated the declaration only once. Id. at 771. Here, the terms are not generally prohibitions against violating the law, as in Louis Epstein. Defendants have no rights in Jacobsen's copyrighted work. They have violated Jacobsen's rights multiple times and have done so intentionally. The injunction terms are simple—(a) do not copy, modify, or distribute JMRI copyrighted works, and (b) do not remove, alter, or falsify copyright management information, as defined by 17 U.S.C. Sec. 1202(c), or distribute said CMI. These terms cannot be simpler, especially for infringers who claim to have halted their illegal activities. Thus, the terms are definite enough for Defendants to obey.

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E. Once Again, Defendants' Citations Do Not Stand for the Proposition that They Are Cited For

Defendants once again cite case law that does not state what Defendants say it states. At oral argument, the Federal Circuit caught Defendants in the act, and chastised Defendants for their misrepresentation of case law.

Mr. Jerger: Well, you know, our position is that when the decoder definition files were put on the Internet pursuant to the Artistic License, at that point the exclusive rights, the copyright rights, were given to the general public, and that's what the Judge found, and that's what the <u>Sun Microsystems</u> case says in the Ninth Circuit, when you grant the public a nonexclusive license, you are waiving the right to sue them in copyright infringement.

Judge Hochberg: I don't think Sun goes that far.

Oral argument, at 33:49-34:19. Defendants' misrepresentation of <u>Sun Microsystems</u> to this Court led to the Federal Circuit decision. As shown next, they are continuing their misrepresentations.

Goldie's Bookstore, Inc. v. Superior Court, 739 F.2d 466 (9th Cir. 1984) is cited for supporting, "Speculative losses are insufficient." This precedent actually says: "Speculative <u>injury</u> does not constitute irreparable harm." <u>Id.</u> at 472 (emphasis added). In other words, a harm is not irreparable if it is contingent on multiple events that may or may not happen, or if it is not supported by any facts. Here, open source groups attract users and contributors through compliance with their license. <u>Jacobsen</u>, 535 F.3d at 1378-79. These users and contributors drive the engine that fuels the open source development model. <u>See id.</u> When infringers like Defendants divert those users and contributors, they slow down development. <u>See id.</u> at 1379. The harm, as the Federal Circuit recognized, is real.

<u>United States v. Lyons</u>, 461 U.S. 95 (1983) is cited for: "Past exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself show a present case or controversy regarding injunctive relief." This quotation is incomplete. The full quotation is, "Past exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself show a present case or controversy regarding injunctive relief <u>if unaccompanied by any continuing present adverse effects." Id.</u> at 102. Because KAM's current users and distributors are unaware of their obligations to JMRI, there is a continuing threat of future infringement. Also, these infringers are not contributing to JMRI because they are unaware of their obligations. As discussed in Sec. IV.B, Katzer's refusal to provide any evidence of independent creation of his newer software strongly

suggests that he is continuing to infringe. Continuing, present adverse effects exist. 1 Louis Epstein is cited for "A sin qua non to a preliminary injunction is the identification of 2 3 the work that is subject of the injunction." Louis Epstein addresses an easement dispute between 4 dominant and servient tenement holders. It has nothing to do with copyrights. 5 Doe v. National Board of Medical Examiners, 199 F.3d 146, 152-53 (3d Cir. 1999) is cited for the following: "A plaintiff must present evidence (i.e. a declaration or affidavit) demonstrating 6 7 a likelihood that he or she will be injured by the threatened conduct." Doe does not require a 8 declaration or an affidavit. Here, the evidence is in the record, and in the Federal Circuit Jacobsen 9 decision, describing open source groups and their operation. See 535 F.3d at 1378-79. They are 10 injured unless an injunction issues. 11 Copyright licenses are designed to support the right to exclude; money damages alone do not support or enforce that right. The choice to exact consideration in the 12 form of compliance with the open source requirements of disclosure and explanation of changes, rather than as a dollar-denominated fee, is entitled to no less 13 legal recognition. Indeed, because a calculation of damages is inherently speculative, these types of license restrictions might well be rendered meaningless 14 absent the ability to enforce through injunctive relief. 535 F.3d at 1381-82. 15 The injury is real. The harm is present. The injunction should issue. 16 17 V. **CONCLUSION** For these reasons, Jacobsen asks this Court to grant his Motion for Preliminary Injunction. 18 Respectfully submitted, 19 20 DATED: November 21, 2008 21 Victoria K. Hall, Esq. (SBN.240702) LAW OFFICE OF VICTORIA K. HALL 22 3 Bethesda Metro Suite 700 Bethesda MD 20814 23 Telephone: 301-280-5925 24 Facsimile: 240-536-9142 25 ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF 26 27 28