PAGES 1 - 39

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BEFORE THE HONORABLE JEFFREY S. WHITE, JUDGE /

ROBERT JACOBSEN,

PLAINTIFF,

VS.

NO. C 06-1905 JSW

MATTHEW KATZER, ET AL.

DEFENDANTS.

SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA FRIDAY, JANUARY 19, 2007

## TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

## APPEARANCES:

FOR PLAINTIFF:

VICTORIA K. HALL ATTORNEY AT LAW 3 BETHESDA METRO

SUITE 700

BETHESDA, MD 20814

FOR DEFENDANT:

FIELD & JERGER 610 SW ALDER SUITE 910

PORTLAND, OREGON 97205

BY: ROBERT SCOTT JERGER

ATTORNEY AT LAW

REPORTED BY: JAMES YEOMANS, CSR 4039, RPR

OFFICIAL REPORTER

COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION BY ECLIPSE

1	FRIDAY, JANUARY 19, 2007 9:00 A.M.
2	(THE FOLLOWING PROCEEDINGS WERE HEARD IN OPEN COURT:)
3	THE CLERK: CASE C-06-1905, ROBERT JACOBSEN VERSUS
4	MATTHEW KATZER.
5	COUNSEL, PLEASE STEP FORWARD AND STATE YOUR
6	APPEARANCES.
7	MS. HALL: VICTORIA HALL COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF ROBERT
8	JACOBSEN.
9	THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. GOOD MORNING.
10	MR. JERGER: SCOTT JERGER COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS
11.	MATTHEW KATZER AND KAMIND ASSOCIATES, INC.
12	THE COURT: GOOD MORNING, COUNSEL.
13	DID BOTH SIDES I ASSUME, BOTH SIDES RECEIVED THE
14	COURT'S QUESTIONS?
15	MS. HALL: YES.
16	MR. JERGER: YES.
17	THE COURT: AND THE COURT HAS LOOKED AT THE STATEMENT
18	OF ADDITIONAL AUTHORITIES THAT WERE FILED IN LIGHT OF THE
19	COURT'S QUESTIONS.
20	WHAT I WOULD LIKE THE PARTIES TO DO IS WHAT I WOULD
21	LIKE THE PARTIES TO DO, IS INCORPORATE INTO THEIR RESPONSES
22	WHERE THEIR AUTHORITIES FIT IN.
23	AND PLAINTIFFS WOULD FILED AT 9:00 O'CLOCK LAST
24	NIGHT, OBVIOUSLY, THE COURT COULDN'T FULLY DIGEST THEM, AND PIN
25	CITES WOULD BE VERY HELPFUL, AS WELL AS SPECIFIC PROVISION, AS

WELL AS A GENERAL CONCEPT I WOULD LIKE TO KNOW THAT AS WELL.

SO LET'S START RIGHT OUT WITH THE QUESTIONS. AND I'LL START WITH PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL WITH RESPECT TO QUESTION 1A.

MS. HALL: YES, YOUR HONOR. THE QUESTION IS, IN LIGHT OF THE FACT THAT IMPOSED --

THE COURT: SLOW DOWN.

MS. HALL: -- ON THE USE OF THEIR FREE SOFTWARE, DOES
THIS CREATE A NON-EXCLUSIVE LICENSE?

AND OUR RESPONSE IS THAT THERE IS A LICENSE ONLY IF
THE CONDITIONS HAVE BEEN MET. IF A USER REJECTS THE CONDITIONS
HOW CAN HE SAY HE HAS PERMISSION TO USE THE SOFTWARE, HE CAN'T.

AND HERE WE'VE SEEN NO ATTEMPT WHATSOEVER THAT HE IS INTERESTED IN ACCEPTING THE LICENSE, SO HE IS NOT INTERESTED IN ACCEPTING THE BENEFITS OF THE LICENSE.

THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. SO WITH -- MOVING TO QUESTION

B. SO IF YOUR ANSWER IS YES, WHAT IS THE ESSENCE OF -- IS THE

ESSENCE OF SUCH A NON-EXCLUSIVE LICENSE THE PROMISE NOT TO SUE

FOR COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT?

MS. HALL: IF HE ACCEPTS THE CONDITIONS HE IS A
NON-EXCLUSIVE LICENSEE AND THERE'S A PROMISE NOT TO SUE FOR
COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT. AS LONG AS THE ACTIVITIES WITH -- ARE
IN THE SCOPE OF THE LICENSE AND THE LICENSE HAS NOT BEEN
REVOKED OR CONTRACT RESCINDED, ALONG THOSE LINES.

I THINK, IT'S IMPORTANT TO REMEMBER THAT A LICENSE UNSUPPORTED BY CONSIDERATION MAYBE REVOKED AT ANY TIME. AND

THAT IF THERE IS FOUND TO BE A LICENSE HERE CERTAINLY HAS BEEN REVOKED.

THE COURT: BEFORE I MOVE ONTO QUESTION C AND D,
BECAUSE I'M GOING TO PUT THOSE TO DEFENDANTS IN THE FIRST
INSTANCE, WHAT'S YOUR RESPONSE TO QUESTION 1A AND B?

MR. JERGER: SURE. IN REGARDS TO 1A, I THINK, THAT
THE CONDITIONS DO CREATE A NON-EXCLUSIVE LICENSE. AND I ALSO
THINK A NON-EXCLUSIVE LICENSE IS CREATED BY DEFINITION UNDER
SECTION 204A OF THE COPYRIGHT ACT, WHICH DECLINED A
NON-EXCLUSIVE LICENSE, ANY LICENSE, NO WRITTEN AGREEMENT
BETWEEN THE PARTIES SIGNED BY THE OWNER OF THE COPYRIGHT TO
CREATE AN EXCLUSIVE LICENSE.

THE COURT: ALRIGHT. RESPECT TO B, WHAT IS THE ESSENCE OF THE NON-EXCLUSIVE LICENSE?

MR. JERGER: I AGREE WITH YOUR STATEMENT IN RE CFLC

CASE THE ESSENCE OF A NON-EXCLUSIVE LICENSE IS A PROMISE NOT TO

SUE FOR COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT.

AND THE ANSWER TO THE SECOND PART B IS A LITTLE MORE COMPLICATED, I'LL GO INTO THAT NOW. IT SORT OF INFORMS MY ANSWERS TO C AND D.

THE COURT: ALL RIGHT.

MR. JERGER: IN OUR VIEW, THERE'S THREE POTENTIAL SCENARIOS HERE IN TERMS OF WHAT SORT OF LICENSE, IF ANY, EXISTS.

ONE, IS -- AND WHEN I'M TALKING ABOUT THE LICENSE, I'M

REFERRING TO THE ARTISTIC LICENSE PLAINTIFF INTRODUCED WITH THEIR MOVING PAPERS.

THE FIRST SCENARIO IS DEFENDANTS TOOK THE ALLEGED PRODUCT PURSUANT TO THE ARTISTIC LICENSE, DIDN'T -- THIS IS WHAT MS. HALL JUST ALLUDED TO -- DIDN'T MEET A CONDITION PRECEDENT FOR THAT LICENSE VESTING, THEREFORE, THE LICENSE NEVER VESTED, THEREFORE, DEFENDANTS WOULD BE LIABLE FOR COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT IF THAT WERE THE CASE. THAT'S THE SCENARIO MOST FAVORABLE TO THE PLAINTIFFS.

THE SECOND SCENARIO, THE MIDDLE CASE SCENARIO, WHICH IS, DEFENDANT TOOK PURSUANT TO THE ARTISTIC LICENSE, THE TERMS OF THE LICENSE ARE NOT CONDITIONS PRECEDENT, BUT RATHER COVENANTS AND THAT ANY BREACH WOULD, THEREFORE, BE A BREACHED OF CONTRACT. THAT'S WHERE WE GET TO THE ANSWER TO THIS QUESTION.

THE COURT: MEANING THIS QUESTION, BEING YOUR CLIENT CONTENDS PLAINTIFF CAN ONLY SUE FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT?

BECAUSE WE'RE TALKING -- THE LIMITATIONS ON THE USE ARE COVENANTS NOT CONDITIONS PRECEDENT.

MR. JERGER: CORRECT. THAT IS -- THAT'S THE MIDDLE SCENARIO. THAT IS WHAT OUR AUTHORITIES THAT WE SUBMIT LAST NIGHT ALLUDE TO. CASES THAT FLESH OUT THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN WHAT IS A CONDITION PRECEDENT AND WHAT IS A COVENANT IN A CONTRACT.

THAT'S THE  $\overline{\text{RT}}$  GRAPHICS CASE AND THE  $\overline{\text{FANTASTIC}}$  CASE, AS

WELL AS SOME OTHER CASES WE CITED IN OUR REPLY PAPERS.

THE THIRD SCENARIO IS THE SCENARIO MOST FAVORABLE TO
THE DEFENDANTS. WHICH IS, DEFENDANTS TOOK PURSUANT TO AN
APPLIED LICENSE, BASICALLY HAD NO TERMS; IN OTHER WORDS, THE
ARTISTIC LICENSE DOESN'T APPLY TO THIS TRANSACTION AT ALL.

IN THAT CASE THAT'S THE MOST SIMILAR TO THIS

NON-EXCLUSIVE LICENSE WHERE THERE ARE NO CONDITIONS.

PLAINTIFFS HAVE WAIVED THEIR RIGHT TO SUE FOR COPYRIGHT AND

DEFENDANTS AS WELL AS ANYONE WHO TOOK, PURSUANT TO AN IMPLIED

LICENSE WITH NO TERMS, COULD DO WHATEVER THEY WANT WITH THE

PRODUCT.

THE REASON WE WITHDREW OUR MOTION TO DISMISS THE
COPYRIGHT CLAIM WAS IN RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS INTRODUCTION OF
THE ARTISTIC LICENSE BECAUSE WE BELIEVE AT THIS -- DUE TO THAT,
WHICH WASN'T ALLEGED IN THE COMPLAINT, WE NOW HAVE TO INTRODUCE
EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE TO SHOW WHAT EXACTLY HAPPENED. HOW
DEFENDANTS CAME IN POSSESSION OF THE PRODUCT, WHETHER THE
ARTISTIC LICENSE IS INVOKED OR NOT.

AS PLAINTIFF MENTIONS IN HIS MOVING PAPERS THERE IS NO CLING WRAP OR SHRINK WRAP AGREEMENT TO GET TO THE ARTISTIC LICENSE, IT'S JUST OUT THERE ON THE INTERNET. AND WE BELIEVE WE HAVE TO INTRODUCE EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE SHOW WHAT HAPPENED BACK THEN, AND THAT'S NOT APPROPRIATE FOR THE 12(B)(6) MOTION.

TO PROMOTE EFFICIENCY, GET THIS CASE MOVING, WE'VE WITHDRAWN THE MOTION AT THIS TIME.

THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. WITH RESPECT, THOUGH. TO

QUESTION, I'M NOT SURE YOU ANSWERED QUESTIONS 1C. I DON'T KNOW

IF THAT IS YOUR MIDDLE SCENARIO.

WHERE THE CLAIM IS THAT YOUR CLIENT USED THE MATERIALS EXCEEDING THE SCOPE OF THE LICENSE, UNDER THE CASES CITED BY THE COURT WOULDN'T THAT YIELD COPYRIGHT LIABILITY?

MR. JERGER: I THINK, THAT'S THE FIRST SCENARIO.

THAT'S THE CONDITIONS PRECEDENT TO THE LICENSE VESTING HAVEN'T

BEEN MET. THE DEFENDANTS ARE WORKING WITHOUT A LICENSE OR THE

LICENSE DIDN'T VEST, AND AT THAT POINT, I THINK, THAT'S

EQUIVALENT TO WHAT YOU'RE REFERRING TO AS EXCEEDING THE SCOPE

OF THE LICENSE.

IN OTHER WORDS, THEY'RE ACTING OUTSIDE THE AUTHORITY

OF WHAT SHOULD HAVE BEEN A VALID LICENSE AND SHOULD HAVE TAKEN

A PRODUCT PURSUANT TO. AND IN THAT SCENARIO I DO AGREE

DEFENDANTS WOULD BE LIABLE FOR COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT.

JUST ONE MORE TWIST ON THIS I WANT TO MENTION NOW, SO

I DON'T FORGET BECAUSE RELATES TO THE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

MOTION. THESE QUESTIONS ALSO INFORM THE IRREPARABLE HARM

PRESUMPTION.

THAT'S GENERALLY GIVEN IN -- WHEN YOU'RE DEALING WITH PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONS AND COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT CASES

THERE'S A PRESUMPTION OF IRREPARABLE HARM.

WE DISPUTE THAT IN OUR REPLY PAPERS, BUT IT'S

IMPORTANT TO NOTE THAT IF THIS COURT FINDS THAT DEFENDANTS

TOOK, PURSUANT TO IMPLIED LICENSE WITH NO TERMS. THEN THERE IS NO PRESUMPTION OF IRREPARABLE HARM BECAUSE THE COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT CLAIM CAN'T BE BROUGHT.

AND WE'RE IN THE WORLD OF BREACH OF CONTRACT AND NOT COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT.

THE COURT: WHAT'S YOUR CLIENT'S POSITION WITH RESPECT TO D?

THAT IS, IF THERE IS NO LICENSE FOR WHATEVER REASON,
WHAT AUTHORITY GOVERNS YOUR CLIENT'S USE OF THE MATERIALS?

MR. JERGER: THAT'S THE THIRD SCENARIO, THAT'S THE IMPLIED LICENSE WITH NO TERMS, BASICALLY. WHERE SOMEONE GOES TO JMI WEB SITE DOWNLOADS THE PRODUCTS, NEVER SEE ANY LICENSE, ARTISTIC LICENSE, ANY OTHER LICENSE, NO MEETING OF THE MIND, NO CONTRACT IS FORMED, THEREFORE, JUST IMPLIED LICENSE WITH NO TERMS SINCE IT HAS NO TERMS TO DO WHATEVER.

THE COURT: MS. HALL, RESPONSE?

MS. HALL: YES. I JUST WANT TO STEP BACK AND REDRESS SOME OF THINGS HE SAID ABOUT THE THREE SCENARIOS.

THE SITUATION THAT WE'RE LOOKING AT IS NOT JUST

MERELY, OH, THEY DIDN'T COMPLY WITH ONE SMALL TERM, THEY DIDN'T

COMPLY WITH ANYTHING, ANYTHING WHATSOEVER IN THE ARTISTIC

LICENSE.

WE'RE LOOKING AT A SITUATION WHERE WE HAVE OUR OPEN SOURCE GROUP WHICH SPENDS HUNDREDS, IF NOT THOUSANDS OF YEARS -- OF HOURS OVER FIVE YEARS CREATING A PRODUCT WHICH IS

MEAN'T TO BE USED.

THE COURT: CAN YOU RESTATE THAT?

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SAY, HUNDREDS OF HOURS OVER?

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MS. HALL: OVER FIVE YEARS. COULD BE EASILY -- WE HAVEN'T -- THOUSANDS -- WE HAVEN'T TOTALED IT UP, MORE THAN A DOZEN PEOPLE WORKED ON THIS.

I DON'T KNOW I UNDERSTOOD WHAT YOU'RE SAYING. YOU

WHAT DEFENDANTS DID IS THEY TOOK THAT PRODUCT, STRIPED OUT THE AUTHOR'S NAME AND THE COPYRIGHT HEADERS, CONVERTED IT TO THEIR OWN FORMAT, THEN PRESENTED IT IN THEIR OWN AS THEIR OWN PRODUCT.

THEY WERE FREE RIDING ON THE EFFORTS OF THIS OPEN SOURCE GROUP. THESE GROUPS NEED THE PROTECTION OF COPYRIGHT LAW, THAT'S THE REASON WHY WE HAVE A COPYRIGHT CLAIM IN THIS AND IT'S THE REASON WHY WE'RE SEEKING THIS PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION, WHICH I'LL GET INTO IT FURTHER.

WE BELIEVE THAT THE LANGUAGE HERE IS DIFFERENT THEN THE LANGUAGE CITED IN THE CASES THAT DEFENDANT RELIES UPON. DEFENDANTS -- THE LANGUAGE CITED ARE THINGS SUCH -- ARE PRETTY CLEARLY COVENANTS, BUT HERE WHAT WE'RE LOOKING AT ARE TERMS, THAT LANGUAGE THAT IS A CONDITION THAT HAS PROVIDED THAT AND WE BELIEVE THAT CREATES A CONDITION PRECEDENT.

AND IN THE ALTERNATIVE WE BELIEVE THE INTERPRETATION OF THE CONTRACT REQUIRES THAT REASONABLE MODIFICATIONS BE MADE, NOT THE KIND OF WHOLESALE RIP-OFF THE DEFENDANTS DID.

THE COURT: WOULD YOU AGREE, JUST AS A GENERAL MATTER, IF WE'RE TALKING ABOUT BREACH OF CONTRACT HERE AS OPPOSED TO COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT, THAT YOUR CLIENT IS NOT ENTITLED TO AN INJUNCTION?

LET'S ASSUME THERE'S NO BREACH OF CONTRACT, BREACH OF COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT, ARE YOU STILL ENTITLED TO AN INJUNCTION?

MS. HALL: PURELY NONE IN TERMS OF SOME OF THE ELEMENTS OF COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT HAVEN'T BEEN MET, YES, I WOULD AGREE WITH YOU. BUT THE ELEMENTS HAVE BEEN MET AND --

THE COURT: I UNDERSTAND.

MS. HALL: -- THE LICENSE HAS BEEN REVOKED.

THE COURT: I UNDERSTAND YOUR POSITION. AND THAT'S

ONE OF THE THINGS WE'RE DISCUSSING THIS MORNING AND THE COURT

HAS TO DECIDE.

BUT A STATEMENT WAS MADE, PUTTING ASIDE THE QUESTION
OF SHOWING OF IRREPARABLE HARM WHERE YOU'RE DEALING WITH
NON-EXCLUSIVE LICENSE, IF WE'RE NOT OUT OF THE WORLD IN
COPYRIGHT AND IN THE WORLD OF BREACH OF CONTRACT WE ALL SHOULD
AGREE, SHOULD WE NOT, PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION IS NOT
APPROPRIATE?

MS. HALL: PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION UNDER COPYRIGHT IS

NOT APPROPRIATE. HOWEVER, I THINK, MIGHT BE APPROPRIATE UNDER

17200.

THE COURT: CONTINUE YOUR RESPONSE WITH RESPECT TO

OUESTION ONE.

MS. HALL: DEFENDANTS ARE TRYING TO RELY UPON A NON-EXCLUSIVE IMPLIED LICENSE. HOWEVER, THE REQUIREMENTS NEED TO BE MADE IN ORDER TO BE ABLE TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF IMPLIED LICENSE.

THAT IS, THAT THERE NEEDS TO BE SOMETHING SPECIFIC, SOME SPECIFIC EXCHANGE BETWEEN PLAINTIFF AND DEFENDANTS IN ORDER TO BE ABLE TO GET THE BENEFIT OF AN IMPLIED LICENSE.

THAT'S SOMETHING THAT'S SAID IN THE CASE LAW.

IT'S, I BELIEVE, IN TAX ASSOCIATE AS WELL AS THE IAE

CASE, WHERE IS ANY KIND OF EVIDENCE WHATSOEVER THAT THEY HAD

ANY KIND OF SPECIFIC EXCHANGES BETWEEN -- WITH MR. JACOBSEN,

THERE IS NONE, AND CERTAINLY THEY COULD HAVE PRODUCED SOMETHING

IN THEIR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION MOTION, I HAVEN'T SEEN IT.

THAT ADDRESSES THE COMMENTS THAT I HAD ABOUT WHAT

MR. JERGER WAS SAYING SPECIFICALLY OC, JUST AS I WAS SAYING

WE'RE ASSUMING THAT DEFENDANTS HAVE A LICENSE WHICH, OF COURSE,

WE DISPUTE.

AND WE ALSO BELIEVE THAT PER THE SOS DECISION, NINTH CIRCUIT DECISION, THE LICENSE NEEDS TO BE NARROWLY CONSTRUCT AND BECAUSE OF THAT NARROW CONSTRUCTION THEIR ACTIVITIES ARE OUTSIDE OF ANY LICENSE THAT THEY COULD POSSIBLY TAKE ADVANTAGE OF.

THE COURT: ALL RIGHT.

MS. HALL: AS FOR D, WE BELIEVE IT WOULD BE COVERED BY

COPYRIGHT. 7 THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. ANYTHING YOU WANT TO SAY 2 FURTHER? 3 MR. JERGER: I'LL JUST RESPOND TO A COUPLE OF POINTS 4 SHE MADE. 5 IN REGARD TO SPECIFIC EXCHANGE BETWEEN PLAINTIFF AND 6 DEFENDANTS, THERE HAS BEEN AN EXCHANGE THAT PLAINTIFF PUT THE 7 SOFTWARE ON THE INTERNET AND THE DEFENDANTS ALLEGEDLY 8 DOWNLOADED THE SOFTWARE. THAT'S THE EXCHANGE. 9 IT'S A HIGHLY FACTUAL SITUATION, I THINK, THAT WE 10 WOULD -- UNFORTUNATELY GOING TO HAVE TO DELVE INTO AT SOME 11 POINT REGARDING WHAT LICENSE, IF ANY, VESTED. 12 ONE MORE OUICK POINT IN TERMS OF CONSTRUING THE 13 ARTISTIC LICENSE, AND THE PLAINTIFF CITES THE SOS DECISION, 14 STATING THE LICENSE SHOULD BE NARROWLY CONSTRUED. 1.5 I THINK, IT'S CLEAR UNDER CALIFORNIA CASE LAW THAT A 16 17 CONDITIONS PRECEDENT ARE DISFAVORED, IF WE WERE TO CONSTRUE 18 THAT LICENSE IT CONTAINS COVENANTS RATHER THAN CONDITIONS. 19 THE COURT: LET'S MOVE ONTO QUESTION ONE. 20 MS. HALL: JUST INTERJECT. WHAT THEY'RE SAYING, WHEN 21 IT COMES TO THE AVAILABILITY OF THE SOFTWARE ANYONE COULD TAKE A LOOK AT IT, THEREFORE, THEY GET A LICENSE OR THEY'RE SUBJECT 22 23 TO IMPLIED LICENSE. 24 THE WORLD-WIDE CHURCH OF GOD DECISION SAYS IT CAN'T BE 25 SOMETHING SO BROAD AND SCATTER SHOT AS WHAT DEFENDANTS

DESCRIBE, IT NEEDS TO BE SOMETHING SPECIFIC.

THERE NEEDS TO BE SOME SORT OF EXCHANGES BETWEEN THEM,

THERE NEEDS TO BE SOMETHING WHERE THEY HAVE TOLD DEFENDANTS AND

THERE HAS BEEN A LACK OF OBJECTION OR A PERMISSION GIVEN

SPECIFICALLY BY MR. JACOBSEN, THAT'S NOT HERE.

THE COURT: THANK YOU. LET'S MOVE TO QUESTION ONE.

UNDER THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS, AND I'M GOING TO

ADDRESS THIS TO THE --

MS. HALL: DID YOU WANT NUMBER TWO?

THE COURT: I'M SORRY, THANK YOU VERY MUCH. WHY DON'T YOU MOVE TO QUESTION NUMBER TWO, UNDER GENERAL QUESTIONS.

MS. HALL: SHOULD I START?

THE COURT: YES, PLEASE.

MS. HALL: WHAT THE DIFFERENCE HERE IS THE DIFFERENCE
BETWEEN TRADEMARK AND THE PURPOSE OF TRADEMARK AND COPYRIGHT.

TRADEMARK IS VERY SPECIFIC IN THAT A TRADEMARK IS USED AS AN
IDENTIFIER OF SOURCE. IT IS USED --

THE COURT: BEFORE YOU GET TO THAT, ALTHOUGH THAT'S

CERTAINLY SUGGESTED BY THE SECOND SENTENCE OF THE SECOND

QUESTION. THIS IS A YES OR NO QUESTION, THEN YOU CAN EXPLAIN.

IS THERE ANY AUTHORITY IN THE COPYRIGHT CONTEXT ON THE ISSUE OF ACCESSIBILITY TO A LICENSING OF OPEN SOURCE MATERIALS? THIS IS SORT OF LIKE UNIX?

MS. HALL: SCO THING THAT'S GOING ON?

THE COURT: YES.

HAVE YOU FOUND ANY AUTHORITY ON THAT POINT?

MS. HALL: NO, I HAVE NOT. CAN I CHECK WITH A COUPLE OF PEOPLE BACK HERE?

THE COURT: NO, COUNSEL, YOU CAN'T DO THAT. THAT'S WHY I PUBLISH THESE IN ADVANCE. SO THE ANSWER FOR NOW IS NO?

MS. HALL: NO.

THE COURT: SO NOW YOU CAN CONTINUE YOUR ANSWER, ON WHY THIS IS NOT AKIN TO AN ANALYSIS OF NAKED LICENSES IN THE TRADEMARK AREA.

MS. HALL: TRADEMARK IS VERY DIFFERENT THEN COPYRIGHT,
IN THAT A TRADEMARK OWNER NEEDS TO POLICE THE MARK, A COPYRIGHT
OWNER DOES NOT HAVE TO DO THAT.

THE REASON IS BECAUSE THE ASSOCIATION OF THE TRADEMARK WITH THE GOODS, THE ASSOCIATION OF A TRADEMARK REPRESENTING OUALITY AND SOURCE OF GOODS.

SO TRADEMARK OWNER IS REQUIRED TO POLICE THAT MARK, IF
OTHER PEOPLE START USING IT THEY BEGIN TO LOSE THEIR RIGHTS TO
IT, IT MAY FALL BY THE WAYSIDE UNDER THE PRINCIPAL OF
GENERICIDE. COPYRIGHT DOESN'T HAVE ANY SUCH REQUIREMENT.

THE COURT: COUNSEL.

MR. JERGER: THE ANSWER --

THE COURT: HAVE YOU FOUND ANY AUTHORITY?

MR. JERGER: NO, I HAVE NOT FOUND ANY AUTHORITY.

IN REGARD TO THE SECOND QUESTION, I DO THINK THE SITUATION IS AKIN TO THE NAKED LICENSE ISSUE IN THE TRADEMARK

CONTEXT AND, AGAIN, I GO BACK TO THE IMPLIED LICENSE IDEA.

IT'S A HIGHLY FACTUAL INQUIRY, I THINK, AND YOU NEED TO TAKE A LOOK AT HOW A PERSON TOOK THE SOFTWARE. WHETHER, YOU KNOW, IN THIS CASE THERE'S ARTISTIC LICENSE ON THE INTERNET, BUT IT'S NOT READILY AVAILABLE, AND THAT RESULTS POTENTIALLY IN AN IMPLIED LICENSE, I THINK, WOULD BE THE EQUIVALENT LEGALLY AS THIS NAKED LICENSE IDEA IN THE TRADEMARK CONTEXT.

THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. LET'S MOVE ONTO THE

DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS. AND I HAVE TO -- I'M GOING TO

ASK PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL TO RESPOND IN THE FIRST INSTANCE,

BECAUSE THIS IS ONE OF THE MOST ARCANE ARGUMENTS I'VE EVER

SEEN.

IT MAY BE BRILLIANT, BUT IT'S ARCANE. AND I, FRANKLY, DON'T UNDERSTAND IT. THAT'S WHAT REALLY GIVES BIRTH TO THESE QUESTIONS.

SO IS THE COURT CORRECT IN ITS ASSESSMENT OF YOUR CLAIM FOR UNJUST ENRICHMENT?

MS. HALL: I BELIEVE SO.

THE COURT: YOU WANT TO --

MS. HALL: IF I UNDERSTAND YOU RIGHT.

THE COURT: IF YOU UNDERSTAND YOUR CLAIM.

MS. HALL: IF I UNDERSTAND YOUR QUESTION AND WHERE YOU'RE COMING FROM.

THE COURT: ALL RIGHT.

MS. HALL: I BELIEVE THAT IT IS. I BELIEVE, WHAT

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WE'RE ASKING FOR IS SOMETHING DIFFERENT THEN WHAT REMEDY THAT
WOULD BE AVAILABLE UNDER COPYRIGHT LAW. THAT'S WHAT TAKES IT
OUT OF PREEMPTION.

THE COURT: IF THE COURT IS CORRECT, THEN WE GO TO THE SECOND QUESTION, HOW WOULD THE PLAINTIFF HAVE BEEN ENTITLED TO CLAIM SUCH A TAX ADVANTAGE SINCE HE OFFERED THE PRODUCT FOR FREE?

MS. HALL: THE REASON I WOULD TELL YOU THAT IT IS

UNDER THE PRINCIPALS OF RESTITUTION, THAT HE'S REQUIRED, THAT

HE IS ENTITLED TO THAT BENEFIT.

SAY, IF MR. JACOBSEN HAD A \$50 WATCH AND, SAY, MR.

KATZER TOOK THAT \$50 WATCH AND PUT IT ON E-BAY AND SAID FOR

SALE, THIS IS TOM CRUISE'S OR BRAD PITT'S WATCH, I CAN GIVE YOU

A CERTIFICATE OF AUTHENTICITY, WHATEVER, IT SELLS FOR \$5,000.

WHAT MR. JACOBSEN WILL BE ENTITLED TO IS THE FULL BENEFIT THAT MR. KATZER GOT FROM THAT. HE WOULDN'T BE ENTITLED TO MERELY 50 BUCKS, HE WOULD BE ENTITLED TO THE FULL 5,000, THAT'S A PRINCIPAL OF RESTITUTION.

THERE IS SOME DISCUSSION OF RESTITUTION THAT -- IN

SOME OF THE CASES I CITE, IN PARTICULAR KOREA SUPPLY AND ALSO

THE OLWELL CASE. OLWELL CASE ABOUT THE USE OF AN EGG WASHER OF

ALL THINGS AND KOREA SUPPLY -- DO YOU WANT A CITE?

THE COURT: NO, IT'S IN YOUR PAPERS, WE HAVE THE CITATION.

MS. HALL: IT'S ONE OF THE NEW ONES.

THE COURT: COUNSEL. YOU, OBVIOUSLY, CAN'T COMMENT ON WHAT PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM IS, AT LEAST, PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL AGREED THE COURT CORRECTLY CONSTRUED IT, WHAT ABOUT HER EGG WASHER ANALOGY OR BRAD PITT ANALOGY?

MR. JERGER: WELL, I THINK, THE COURT HAS NAILED IT ON THE HEAD WITH THE INFORMATION IN THE QUESTION. ONE SPECIFICALLY -- WHAT'S GLARINGLY MISSING HERE FROM AN UNJUST ENRICHMENT CLAIM IS RETENTION OF A BENEFIT AT THE EXPENSE OF ANOTHER. UNDER NO POSSIBLE SCENARIO HAS THE PLAINTIFF LOST SOME SORT OF BENEFIT OR SUFFERED SOME SORT OF EXPENSE.

TYPICAL UNJUST ENRICHMENT CLAIM, I AGREE TO PUT A NEW ROOF ON YOUR HOUSE, I DO IT, YOU DON'T PAY ME, I'M ENTITLED, EVEN IF WE DON'T HAVE A CONTRACT TO, A QUASI CONTRACT QUANTUM MERIT EQUITABLE RECOVERY FOR THE VALUE OF THE ROOF THAT I INSTALLED ON YOUR HOUSE.

THIS CASE I AGREE I DON'T UNDERSTAND THE CLAIM AND IT
DOESN'T MAKE SENSE TO ME BECAUSE -- IT JUST DOESN'T. IT'S
TRYING TO PUT A SQUARE PEG INTO A ROUND HOLE. THERE'S NO LOSS
OF GOODS OR SERVICES THAT THE PLAINTIFF HAS SUFFERED TO JUSTIFY
ANY KIND OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT THEORY.

MS. HALL: THE BENEFIT MR. JACOBSEN AND THE REST OF THE JMRI GROUP CONFERRED UPON MR. KATZER IS THE BENEFIT OF SAVED TIME AND THE BENEFIT OF A QUALITY PRODUCT.

WHAT THEY ASKED FOR IN RETURN WAS THAT THEY FOLLOW THE TERMS OF THE LICENSE AND THAT THEY GIVE CREDIT AS WELL, THAT

WAS THE BENEFIT THAT WAS NOT GIVEN BACK.

SO WHAT WE'RE ASKING FOR, OKAY, YOU GOT THIS BENEFIT, WE BELIEVE YOU TOOK SOME SORT OF TAX CREDIT FOR IT, SO THIS IS PART OF THE RESTITUTION THAT WE WANT TO GET IF YOU'RE GOING TO TAKE -- IF YOU'RE GOING TO BENEFIT FROM OUR WORK AND GET MONEY FROM OUR WORK, THEN RETURN THAT MONEY TO US.

THE COURT: EVEN IF YOU'RE OFFERING THAT WORK FOR FREE?

MS. HALL: FREE WITH RESTRICTIONS. KEY POINT.

THE COURT: FREE IS A RELATIVE TERM.

MS. HALL: ACTUALLY, THE ARTISTIC LICENSE IS SUCH IF
YOU MAKE MODIFICATIONS YOU CAN DO IT UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS
OR YOU CAN CONTRACT THE HEAD OF THE OPEN SOURCE GROUP AND SAY,
LET'S GO WORK OUT SOME SORT OF A DEAL.

THAT ACTUALLY OFFERS A POSSIBILITY THAT IF THERE WAS SOMETHING THAT THIS PERSON WAS DOING THAT WOULD -- WAS NOT NECESSARILY ACCEPTABLE, THERE MAYBE SOME NEGOTIATION FOR A CHARGE.

THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. LET'S MOVE ONTO QUESTION

NUMBER -- ANYTHING FURTHER YOU WANT TO SAY?

OKAY. QUESTION TWO, MS. HALL.

MS. HALL: HOW ABOUT IF I JUST SAY, LET'S NOT GO FOR DECODOPRO.COM BACK IN THIS LITIGATION. WE -- DECODOPRO.COM BACK IN THIS LITIGATION.

IF THAT'S THE CASE I STATED A CLAIM FOR CYBER

SQUATTING, THE ELEMENTS OF CYBER SQUATTING LISTED IN THE BOSLEY DECISION I CITED WITH THE STATUTORY DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY'S FEES.

AND WHAT WE ALSO LIKE TO HAVE IS ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COST FOR BRINGING AN IN REM ACTION IN EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, WHICH IS ASSIGNED, PUT IN THE COURT'S CUSTODY IN EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA AND WE'LL TAKE IT FROM THERE.

AND THE OTHER TWO CASES CITED FOR IN REM ACTIONS ARE THE HARRODS CASE AND THE PORSHA CARS CASE.

THE COURT: THAT MAYBE ALL WELL AND GOOD. THE ANSWER

TO QUESTION NUMBER TWO, ARE YOU IMPLICITLY SAYING THE COURT

CANNOT INVALIDATE A SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT, AT LEAST, IN ANOTHER

COURT?

MS. HALL: I OFFERED AN ALTERNATIVE, IF THAT'S NOT AN ALTERNATIVE THE COURT WANTS TO PURSUE, THEN I THINK WE MAY BE STUCK ON THAT POINT.

BUT IF -- IF -- IF WE DECIDE WE DO NOT WANT TO HAVE

THIS COURT ORDER THE RETURN OF DECODERPRO.COM WE'RE OUT OF THIS

AND JERRY BRITTON NO LONGER A REQUIRED PARTY.

THE ELEMENTS ARE MR. JACOBSEN HAS A VALID TRADEMARK
ENTITLED TO PROTECTION. THE MARK IS DISTINCTIVE. THE

DEFENDANT'S DOMAIN NAME IDENTICAL OR CONFUSINGLY SIMILAR TO THE

MARK, DEFENDANT USED, REGISTERED OR TRAFFIC IN THE DOMAIN --

THE COURT: SLOW DOWN.

MS. HALL: AND WITH BAD FAITH, INTENT TO PROFIT.

THERE IS NO REQUIREMENT FOR RETURN OF DECODERPRO COM, WE CAN SIMPLY SAY WE DON'T NECESSARILY WANT TO HAVE THAT BACK.

THE COURT: AND RESPONSE TO THE SECOND PART OF QUESTION TWO, I TAKE IT, MR. -- IS IT BRETAN?

MS. HALL: MR. BRITTON.

THE COURT: DOES HE CONSENT TO THIS COURT'S

JURISDICTION?

MS. HALL: WE HAVEN'T ASKED HIM YET. IF YOU DID

REQUIRE -- IF -- IF -- I MEAN, IF WE SAY WE DON'T WANT TO HAVE

DECODOPRO.COM RETURN IN THIS LITIGATION, TO US I THINK THAT

MOOTS THAT QUESTION BECAUSE HE'S -- WE'RE NOT LOOKING AT

ATTACKING THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT ANY LONGER.

THE COURT: IS THAT YOUR POSITION?

MS. HALL: IF YOU ORDER ME TO JOIN MR. BRITTON IT IS
PROBABLY, BUT I NEED TO GO CHECK WITH MR. BRITTON SEE IF HE'S
WILLING TO SUBJECT HIM TO THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT.

THE COURT: ANYTHING YOU GOT TO SAY ON THAT POINT?

MR. JERGER: I'M NOT SURE I UNDERSTAND THE PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE. I'M NOT SURE HOW TO RESPOND TO THAT, OTHER THAN TO SAY, CITE WHAT -- THE ARGUMENT WE BROUGHT UP IN OUR REPLY PAPERS.

THAT UNDER THE CLAYTON BABBITT CASE THIS COURT DOESN'T HAVE JURISDICTION TO ATTACK A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT IN OREGON DISTRICT COURT.

THE COURT: I THINK, WE HAVE AN AGREEMENT ON THAT.

WAS.

MR. JERGER: I DIDN'T QUITE FOLLOW WHAT HER ARGUMENT

MS. HALL: MY ARGUMENT IS, THAT WE DON'T WANT TO -
THE COURT: COUNSEL, WAIT. THE COURT ASKS THE

QUESTIONS. IF COUNSEL DOESN'T UNDERSTAND AN ANSWER, HE DOESN'T

GET TO GET AN ANSWER FROM YOU UNLESS I ASK FOR IT.

I UNDERSTOOD YOUR ANSWER. AS FRIGHTENING AS THAT MIGHT BE, I DID UNDERSTAND YOUR ANSWER.

QUESTION NUMBER THREE. THIS GOES TO PARAGRAPHS H AND T, WHICH I READ A COUPLE OF TIMES AND I'M JUST AT A LOSS, I HAVEN'T BEEN ABLE TO FIND ANY AUTHORITY THAT GIVES YOU THE RELIEF. ONE IS, I THINK, T IS REFERRING THIS MATTER TO THE U.S. ATTORNEY FOR SOME KIND OF PERJURY PROSECUTION, WHAT IS -- DO YOU HAVE ANY AUTHORITY?

MS. HALL: I RELIED UPON THE COURT'S INHERENT

AUTHORITY TO INVESTIGATE WRONGDOING BY THE PARTIES AND I'M

CITING CHAMBERS STANDARD ELECTRIC AND TIMES HERALD PRINTING

COMPANY.

TIMES HERALD PRINTING COMPANY INVOLVED A MOTION FROM ONE OF THE PARTIES TO REFER A PERJURY MATTER FOR PROSECUTION TO THE U.S. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE AND THE COURT IN THAT INSTANCE DECIDED NOT TO DO IT, BUT IT DIDN'T SAY, SORRY, I DON'T HAVE THAT POWER.

THE CONSOLATION PROCEEDINGS SOMETHING THE U.S.

ATTORNEY CAN DO, IT'S VERY RARE, BUT IT IS A POSSIBILITY, AND I

WANTED TO LEAVE THAT POSSIBILITY OPEN BECAUSE WE BELIEVE THAT
THE THEFT THAT HAS GONE ON BY DEFENDANTS IN THIS CASE THAT WE
HAVE SEEN IN COPYRIGHT AND SEEN ALSO IN THE CYBER SQUATTING
EXTENDS ALSO TO THE PATENTS, AND WHEN THE FULL FACTS ARE KNOWN
WE WANT TO PRESENT THAT AS A POSSIBILITY THAT THE COURT WILL
CONSIDER.

THE COURT: OKAY. CHAMBERS VERSUS NASCO HAS TO DO WITH THE COURT'S INHERENT AUTHORITY TO SANCTION COUNSEL WHO BASICALLY CONDUCT THEMSELVES IN BAD FAITH IN A PROCEEDING BEFORE THE COURT.

MS. HALL: IT DISCUSSES THAT THERE ARE STATUTES, DO

NOT LIMIT THE COURT'S AUTHORITY TO BE ABLE TO PUNISH,

INVESTIGATE WRONGDOING OF PARTIES. AND SO I CITED THAT CASE

FOR THAT PROPOSITION THAT IT'S NOT MERELY LIMITED TO, SAY, RULE

11 OR 28 USC SECTION 1927. 28 USC 1927.

THE COURT: ANYTHING YOU WANT TO SAY?

MR. JERGER: WE'VE FOUND NO AUTHORITY EITHER TO AUTHORIZE UNDER ANY FEDERAL OR STATE STATUTE THE RELIEF REQUESTED IN PARAGRAPHS H AND T.

THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. LET'S MOVE ONTO PLAINTIFF'S

MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION. AND FIRST QUESTION I'LL PUT

TO PLAINTIFF IN THE FIRST INSTANCE.

MS. HALL: PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO A PRESUMPTION OF IRREPARABLE HARM BECAUSE OF THE INFRINGEMENT, THAT'S ONE THINGS THAT WE'RE RELYING UPON.

AND THE OTHER THING IS THAT WE DON'T HAVE ANY PROOF WHATSOEVER THAT THEY HAVE COMPLIED WITH THE TERMS AND THAT THERE IS -- THEY'VE OFFERED NO PROOF THAT -- THERE'S NO WAY THAT THEY COULD RETURN TO THEIR OLD WAYS.

WE HAVE CD -- WE HAVE 307 RIGHT HERE, APPARENTLY A NEW ONE CALLED 308, WHICH HAS NOT BEEN RECEIVED BY MY CLIENT, MY CLIENT ENTITLED TO UPDATES, HE'S NOT SENT MY CLIENT THESE YET.

MY CLIENT HAS TRIED TO OPEN UP THE DATABASE TO FIND
OUT WHETHER OR NOT THE SAME SELECTION COMPILATION ORDERING
GROUPING THAT IS IMPORTANT IN THE DECODER DEFINITIONAL FILES IN
THAT STILL PRESENT, THAT WOULD INDICATE THAT OUR FILES WERE THE
SOURCE OF THOSE AND THERE'S A REASON TO THINK THAT IT MIGHT
VERY WELL BE.

HOW LONG DID IT TAKE FOR PLAINTIFF TO DEVELOP THESE FILES? SAY, FIVE YEARS, HUNDREDS, THOUSANDS OF HOURS, DOZENS OF THOUSANDS?

DEFENDANT SEEMS TO COME UP WITH OVERNIGHT A DATABASE
THAT HAS ALL THESE SAME THINGS, ALL THESE SAME THING THAT
PLAINTIFF NOW OFFERS, HOW COULD HE HAVE DONE THAT OVERNIGHT?

THE COURT: WHAT EVIDENCE IS BEFORE THE COURT THAT THE DEFENDANTS HAVE NOT VOLUNTARILY COMPLIED WITH THE TERMS OF THE -- YOUR DEMAND AND TO PROVE THAT THIS ALLEGED WRONGFUL ACTIVITY CANNOT REASONABLY BE EXPECTED TO RECUR. YOU HAVE THE BURDEN.

MS. HALL: ACTUALLY, WE PROVE THEY COMMITTED

INFRINGEMENT, IT'S THEIR JOB, THE BURDEN ACTUALLY SHIFTS TO THEM TO SHOW THAT THEY ARE NO LONGER INFRINGING.

ALL WE HAVE A CONCLUSORY STATEMENT. WE HAVE NOTHING FROM THIS CD, I GAVE THIS CD TO MR. JERGER AND SAY OPEN THIS UP AND SHOW US WHAT IS ON THE CD AND IN THE DATABASE, AND THE BURDEN IS ON THEM ONCE WE HAVE SHOWN THAT THEY HAVE INFRINGED FOR THEM TO SHOW, NO, THEY DON'T AND, NO, THEY WILL NOT CONTINUE.

THE COURT: ALL RIGHT.

MR. JERGER: JUST TO INITIALLY ADDRESS THAT. WE DISAGREE THAT THE BURDEN IS ON US. PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION EXTRAORDINARY REMEDY MEANT TO PRESERVE THE STATUS QUO.

WE SUBMITTED A DECLARATION THAT SHOWS WE ARE NOT DOING ANYTHING AT ALL WHATSOEVER, AND THAT IN -- OUT OF ABUNDANCE OF CAUTION WE HAVE RETOOLED EVERY POSSIBLE ALLEGEDLY INFRINGING PIECE OF SOFTWARE AND THEY COME FORWARD WITH NO EVIDENCE THAT WE ARE NOT, IN FACT, DOING THAT.

THEY ARE RESTING ON THIS PRESUMPTION OF IRREPARABLE

HARM, WHICH AS I STATED BEFORE, I DON'T THINK APPLIES. BUT

EVEN IF IT DOES APPLY, I THINK, DEFENDANTS HAVE EFFECTIVELY

REBUTTED THAT PRESUMPTION, A, BECAUSE THEY HAVEN'T ALLEGED ANY

HARM THEY HAVE, B, THEY HAVEN'T SHOWN THAT WE HAVE NOT COMPLIED

WITH THESE REQUESTS, C, THEIR CONDUCT WHICH I GO THROUGH IN MY

REPLY PAPERS WITH THE DELAY, THESE SORTS OF THINGS, AND SO

THAT'S MY RESPONSE TO HER IDEAS THERE.

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NOW, I WANT TO JUMP BACK TO QUESTION NUMBER ONE. WHAT HARM DOES PLAINTIFF SEEK TO PREVENT BY AN INJUNCTION THAT'S ADDRESSED TO THE PLAINTIFF?

IS IT ABSOLUTELY CLEAR DEFENDANT'S ALLEGEDLY WRONGFUL. ACTIVITY CANNOT REASONABLY BE EXPECTED TO OCCUR, AND I WOULD SAY, YES, IT IS ABSOLUTELY CLEAR WHAT WE'RE TALKING ABOUT HERE IS A SPREAD SHEET OF DATA.

WHAT MY CLIENT HAS DONE IS COMPLETELY REPLACED THAT WITH NEW DATA 100 PERCENT. IT SERVES THE SAME FUNCTIONALITY AS THE DECODER DEFINITION FILES, THE PREVIOUS ALLEGED DECODER DEFINITION FILES THAT WERE IN MY CLIENT'S SOFTWARE, 100 PERCENT THE SAME FUNCTIONALITY.

IN OTHER WORDS, THE DECODER DEFINITION FILES IS NO VALUE, THERE WOULD BE NO REASON MY CLIENT WOULD EVER REVERT TO ANY OF THE ALLEGEDLY INFRINGING PRODUCT.

HE'S TAKEN EVERYTHING THAT'S ~- THAT THEY ALLEGE INFRINGES OFF HIS WEB SITE, HE SHIPS NEW PRODUCT. I HAVE THE VERSION 308 WITH ME IF MS. HALL WOULD LIKE A COPY OF THAT. THE NEW SOFTWARE AS IT'S GONE FORWARD HAS 100 PERCENT REPLACED ALL THE ALLEGED INFRINGING PRODUCT.

I THINK, IT IS ABSOLUTELY CLEAR THAT ALL ALLEGEDLY INFRINGING ACTIVITY CEASED AND THERE'S NO POSSIBILITY OF RECURRENCE BECAUSE THERE'S NO REASON THAT DEFENDANTS WOULD EVER GO BACK TO THE OLD ALLEGEDLY INFRINGING DATA WHEN THEY HAVE THEIR OWN DATA WHICH IS SERVES A HUNDRED PERCENT OF THE

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FUNCTIONALITY.

THE COURT: SO, LET THEY STOP YOU. WE HAVE A DECLARATION TO THAT EFFECT. WHAT EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD REFUTES THAT?

AND EVEN ASSUMING YOUR ANALYSIS OF PROCEDURAL POSTURE

IS CORRECT ON -- THE BURDEN SHIFTS BY VIRTUE OF THE DECLARATION

THAT THE DEFENDANTS SUBMITTED, IT HAS SHIFTED, YOU GOT A HIGH

ENERGY SITUATION.

MS. HALL: WHO CAN'T OPEN THIS DATABASE AND HE'S

CONSULTED WITH FRIENDS WHO ARE ALSO EXPERTS IN SOFTWARE AND

THEY CAN'T OPEN THE DATABASE EITHER. THEY HAD TWO MONTHS, WHY

COULDN'T THEY GIVE US THE SPREAD SHEET THEY TALK ABOUT? WE

COULD HAVE DONE OUR OWN ANALYSIS.

THE COURT: THE POINT IS, DO YOU HAVE ANY EVIDENCE

TO -- OTHER THAN WHAT YOU'RE SAYING HERE VERBALLY IN COURT, TO

REFUTE THE DECLARATION THAT THE DEFENDANTS SUBMITTED THEY

BASICALLY HAVE CEASED THE ACTIVITY THAT YOUR CLIENT IS

COMPLAINING ABOUT?

MS. HALL: THE EVIDENCE THAT I'VE DESCRIBED ALREADY,

THE EVIDENCE THAT -- THE STATEMENT THEY HAVE MADE IS

CONCLUSORY, DOESN'T OFFER ANY, YOU KNOW, WHERE'S THE SPREAD

SHEET? COULDN'T THEY HAVE INCLUDED THAT?

NO, THEY CAN'T. IT'S THEIR BURDEN TO BE ABLE TO SHOW THEY HAVE STOPPED AND THAT THEY WILL NOT RETURN TO IT. 307 DOES NOT WORK.

THE COURT: HAVE YOU FILED AN OBJECTION?

MS. HALL: YES. I FILED A NUMBER OF OBJECTIONS, BUT I FORGET EXACTLY -- I KNOW I MADE THAT ARGUMENT SOMEWHERE IN MY PAPERS. THIS IS THE -- NECESSARY DON'T WORK.

IT'S IMPORTANT TO REMEMBER THAT THE BURDEN HERE ONCE WE'VE SHOWN THAT IT IS ON THEM AND, SECOND, THAT UNDER W.T.

GRANT THE U.S. SUPREME COURT DECISION THE COURT SHOULD BE WARY ANY ATTEMPT TO DEFEAT THE INJUNCTION BY PROTESTATION REPENTANCE AND REFORM WHEN THE SENSATION TIME TO AVOID THE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION.

THE COURT: SLOW DOWN.

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MS. HALL: THANK YOU.

THE COURT: START OVER AGAIN. TELL US EXACTLY WHERE YOU'RE READING FROM.

MS. HALL: I'M READING FROM A QUOTE FROM W.T. GRANT
WHICH HAVE IN MY NOTES. THAT IS, THAT THE COURT SHOULD BE WARY
OF AN ATTEMPT TO DEFEAT INJUNCTION WHEN THE DEFENDANTS HAVE
BEEN MAKING THESE PROTESTATIONS OF REPENTANCE AND REFORM, AND
THESE PROTESTATIONS ARE TIMED TO AVOID THE PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION, AND THEY HAVEN'T SHOWN THERE IS NO PROBABILITY OF
RECESSION, THE BURDEN ON THEM. AND THEY HAD TWO MONTHS TO GIVE
ME THIS SPREAD SHEET, WHERE IS IT? I DON'T KNOW.

THE COURT: I'LL GIVE YOU THE LAST WORD ON THIS POINT.

MR. JERGER: WELL, THREE QUICK POINTS. I THINK, I

ALREADY ADDRESSED THE MOOTNESS ARGUMENT SHE'S RECENTLY RAISING.

I THINK, THIS IS DISTINGUISHABLE FROM THE LGS CASE THAT YOU CITE IN YOUR TENTATIVE RULING, IN THAT MY CLIENTS HAVE CEASED ALL ACTIVITY, THERE'S NO POSSIBILITY OF REOCCURRENCE AND THERE IS NO CERTAINTY WHETHER ANY INFRINGEMENT IS CURRENTLY ONGOING.

IN REGARD TO THESE CONTINUED ALLEGATIONS THEY CAN'T

GET THE PRODUCT TO WORK, I'LL JUST SAY, THAT MY UNDERSTANDING

FROM MY CLIENT IS THEY HAVEN'T REGISTERED WITH A NEW

REGISTRATION NUMBER AND THAT'S WHY -- THAT'S HIS THEORY ON WHY

THEIR VERSION ISN'T WORKING. THERE'S NO NEFARIOUS THINGS GOING

ON THERE.

THIRD, BACK TO THE BURDEN, WE VIGOROUSLY DISAGREE THAT THEY HAVE MET ANY SORT OF BURDEN AND THAT BURDEN HAS SHIFTED TO US. WE DISAGREE THAT THEY'VE SHOWN IN THEIR MOVING PAPERS THEY WOULD, IN FACT, SUCCEED ON THE MERITS.

SIMPLE THINGS, FOR EXAMPLE, THE PLAINTIFF HASN'T EVEN DEFINED HIS COPYRIGHT RIGHTS WHICH WOULD BE THE FIRST ELEMENT OF A PRIMA FACIE CASE OF COPYRIGHT. WE DON'T KNOW -- OR WE DO KNOW HE'S NOT THE OWNER OF THE -- ALL THE DECODER DEFINITION FILES HE ALLEGES IN PARAGRAPH 41 OF THE AMENDED COMPLAINT.

WE ALSO KNOW HE'S NOT THE OWNER OF THE QSI MANUAL ONE
OF THE INFRINGING DATA PRODUCTS. BEFORE THOSE MERITS ISSUED
WOULD BE DECIDED MORE FACTUAL DISCOVERY WOULD BE NEEDED TO
DETERMINE THE EXTENT OF THE RIGHTS THE FOLKS HAVE.

THEY DIDN'T ASSIGN THEIR COPYRIGHT RIGHTS TO

MR. JACOBSEN, WHETHER THEY WORKED ON THE DECODER DEFINITIONS AS

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A WHOLE OR WHETHER THEY WORKED ON DISCREET PARTS. AND IF THOSE 1 PARTS AREN'T ASSIGNED TO MR. JACOBSEN THEN THOSE AREN'T PART OF 2 ANY SORT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION. HE'S NOT THE OWNER. 3 MS. HALL: I THINK, WE -- ASSIGNMENTS FROM ALL OF THEM 4 OR JUST ABOUT EVERYONE. 5 THE COURT: STOP. LET'S MOVE ONTO QUESTION TWO, AND 6 I'LL PUT THAT QUESTION TO YOU ABOUT DIRECT OR INDUCED 7 INDUCEMENT OF COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT. 8 MR. JERGER: SURE. UPON FURTHER REFLECTION WE AGREE 9 WITH THE COURT THAT DEFENDANTS WOULD BE LIABLE IN THAT 10 SCENARIO. 11 THE COURT: I ASSUME, YOU DON'T DISAGREE TODAY WE 12 13 THAT, MS. HALL? MS. HALL: THE COURT IS CORRECT. 14 THE COURT: THANK YOU. ANYTHING FURTHER THE PARTIES 15 16 WISH TO ADDRESS AT THIS POINT THAT'S NOT IN THE QUESTIONS OR 17 NOT IN YOUR PAPERS? MS. HALL? 18 19 MS. HALL: YES, I'D LIKE TO MAKE A POINT ABOUT THE 20 IRREPARABLE HARM HERE. THERE IS IRREPARABLE HARM, AN 21 INJUNCTION IS AN APPROPRIATE THING TO ISSUE BECAUSE OF THE 22 NATURE OF THE SOURCE GROUPS. 23 OPEN SOURCE GROUPS ARE DEFUSED GROUPS, THEY HAVE A FEW 24 LEADERS. THEY OFTEN DO NOT -- ACTUALLY, I THINK, THE PURPOSE

OF OPEN SOURCE NOT TO CHARGE ANYTHING FOR THE USE OF THE

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SOFTWARE, AND THAT BASICALLY MEANS THERE WILL BE ALMOST NO CHANCE FOR DAMAGES.

UNDER NORMAL CIRCUMSTANCES MAYBE SOME INSTANCES, AND SO IN AN -- INSTANCES DAMAGES ARE NOT ADEQUATE INJUNCTION IS THE REMEDY THAT WE SEEK. WE BELIEVE IT'S AN APPROPRIATE ONE. IT'S ONE THAT'S GOING TO ALLOW THESE OPEN SOURCE GROUPS TO CONTINUE TO FLOURISH. THEY WILL HAVE THIS REMEDY AVAILABLE TO THEM TO BE ABLE TO STOP PEOPLE LIKE MR. KATZER AND HIS COMPANY FROM INFRINGING.

AND ONE THING I ALSO LIKE TO POINT OUT. EVEN IF 307

AND 308 ARE NOT -- AREN'T FUNCTIONAL AND, AGAIN, AS I SAID, I

DON'T HAVE A SPREAD SHEET OR ANY INFORMATION ABOUT THAT,

DEFENDANTS HAVE NOT SHOWN THEY HAVE STOPPED.

THERE ARE OTHER VERSIONS THAT ARE PRESENT OUT THERE
AND MY CLIENT HAS DESCRIBED HOW -- IN HIS DECLARATION HOW
PEOPLE CAN USE THE OTHER VERSIONS AND CAN STILL USE THE
SOFTWARE TOOL.

MR. KATZER SAID THAT HE HAS FIXED IT SO THAT THE SOFTWARE WILL NO LONGER BE FUNCTIONAL AFTER CERTAIN DATE.

WELL, THAT'S -- ONE OF THEM IS IN MARCH OF '07 THAT'S

CONTINUING HARM AND, AGAIN, MY CLIENT THROUGH HIS EXPERIMENTS

THAT IT DOESN'T STOP IN MARCH IT ACTUALLY WILL CONTINUE TO GO

ON, SO THERE IS CONTINUING HARM.

IT'S NOT BEEN STOPPED AND WE ASK THE COURT TO ISSUE A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION.

THE COURT:

THE COURT: COUNSEL, LAST WORD.

MR. JERGER: AS MY CLIENT STATES IN HIS DECLARATION,
HE'S DONE EVERYTHING HUMANLY POSSIBLE HE CAN DO. ALL THE OLD
VERSIONS OUT, ALL REGISTERED USERS HAVE BEEN SENT NEW VERSIONS
WHICH DON'T CONTAIN ANY OF THE ALLEGEDLY INFRINGING PRODUCT,
EVERYTHING BEEN TAKEN OFF THE INTERNET.

THERE'S REALLY NOTHING ELSE HUMANLY POSSIBLE TO DO AND WE, AGAIN, DISAGREE THAT PLAINTIFF ARTICULATED ANY IRREPARABLE HARM, BUT RATHER REST ON A CONCLUSORY STATEMENT THAT HE HAS AND WILL SUFFER IRREPARABLE HARM, AND THIS PRESUMPTION GENERALLY APPLIES TO COPYRIGHT CASES.

THE COURT: LET'S -- MATTER SUBMITTED. I WANT TO MOVE ONTO THE CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE.

THE PARTIES HAVE SUBMITTED A JOINT STATEMENT. THE FIRST THING GIVEN THE NATURE -- TO THE EXTENT THIS CASE CONTINUES GIVEN THE NATURE OF THE, SHALL WE SAY, PENDING DISCOVERY DISPUTES AND THE COMPLEXITY OF THEM, EVEN THOUGH THIS COURT GENERALLY HANDLES ITS OWN DISCOVERY DISPUTES, THIS IS A CASE WHERE I'M GOING TO EXERCISE MY DISCRETION TO REFER ALL DISCOVERY MATTERS TO A RANDOMLY ASSIGNED MAGISTRATE JUDGE TO RESOLVE ALL OF THOSE MATTERS AND I'M GOING TO ORDER THAT IN A WRITTEN ORDER TODAY.

MS. HALL: I HAVE -- I WAS INTERN FOR JUDGE SPERO, I THINK, MIGHT NOT BE A GOOD IDEA TO REFER TO IT TO JUDGE SPERO. TO PUT THAT IN THE RECORD.

THE COURT: I UNDERSTAND THAT GIVEN COUNSEL IS
PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL, THE FACT SHE WAS A EXTERN FOR JUDGE SPERO
WOULD BE INAPPROPRIATE. HE SHOULD BE EXCLUDED FROM THAT RANDOM
ASSIGNMENT.

I WOULD SAY, BASED UPON THE FILINGS HERE, THAT TO THE EXTENT THIS CASE DOES CONTINUE, I THINK, IT WOULD BEHOOVE THE PARTIES, THE PLAINTIFF HAS ALREADY STATED HIS POSITION, TO CONSIDER A CONSENT TO A MAGISTRATE JUDGE FOR ALL PURPOSES.

THIS IS -- ONGOING DISPUTES IN THIS CASE, THIS COURT
HAS A HUGE DOCKET, AND AGAIN THE COURT DOES NOT INTEND TO,
CAN'T AND WON'T REQUIRE THE PARTIES TO SO CONSENT, BUT WE HAVE,
I THINK, SOME OF THE BEST MAGISTRATE JUDGES IN THE COUNTRY WHO
ARE TREATED LIKE DISTRICT JUDGES, ARTICLE 3 JUDGES. THEY HAVE
MORE TIME TO CONSIDER THESE MATTERS AND TO THE EXTENT YOUR
CLIENTS ARE LOOKING FOR EXPEDITIOUS RELIEF YOU'LL GET IT MORE
EXPEDITIOUSLY FROM A MAGISTRATE JUDGE.

SO IN A MATTER -- THIS IS A MATTER, I THINK, BOTH
PLAINTIFF HAS STATED HIS POSITION, DEFENDANTS HAVE STATED THEIR
POSITION, I'D LIKE YOU TO -- BOTH SIDES GO BACK TO THEIR
RESPECTIVE CLIENTS AND TO ADDRESS THIS ISSUE AND LET THE COURT
KNOW BY THE CLOSE OF BUSINESS NEXT WEEK AS A JOINT MATTER
WHETHER YOU'RE WILLING TO RECONSIDER.

AGAIN, NO ADVERSE CONSEQUENCES OTHER THAN WHAT I
MENTIONED, WHICH IS HAVING THE MATTER CONSIDERED BY MORE BUSIER
JUDGE WITH MORE CASES. IF YOU DECIDE NOT TO, BUT IN THE

MEANTIME, IN THE INTERIM I'M GOING TO ORDER THAT ALL DISCOVERY

MATTERS BE HANDLED BY RANDOMLY ASSIGNED MAGISTRATE JUDGE,

EXCEPT JUDGE SPERO.

NOW, BOTH SIDES, YOUR CLIENT HAS INDICATED HIS WILLINGNESS TO CONSENT?

MS. HALL: I HAVEN'T FILED THE PAPERS, BUT.

THE COURT: YOU DON'T NEED TO. BUT WHAT I'M SAYING
IS, I WANT TO KEEP THIS, I'M NOT REALLY INTERESTED IN INKLING
OUT ONE SIDE OR THE OTHER IN TERMS OF WILLINGNESS OR
UNWILLINGNESS.

IF BOTH PARTIES DON'T CONSENT IT DOESN'T GO TO THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE FOR ALL PURPOSES, IN LIGHT OF THE FACT I'M GIVING A WEEK, IN LIGHT OF THE FACT THAT YOU AND YOUR CLIENT HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO OBSERVE THIS COURT, I'M GIVING YOU AN OPPORTUNITY.

IN OTHER WORDS, YOU'RE NOT BOUND BY THAT DECISION. I HOPE THAT YOUR CLIENT WOULD CONSIDER, CONTINUE TO CONSIDER THAT CHOICE, BUT I'M GIVING BOTH SIDES, I WANT A JOINT FILING BY NEXT WEEK INDICATING WHETHER THE PARTIES ARE INTERESTED IN CONSENT.

AND IF YOU CAN MANIFEST THAT BY CONSENTING OR FILING
THE APPROPRIATE PAPERS BY CLOSE OF BUSINESS ON THE 26TH OF
JANUARY OR FILE A STATEMENT THAT SAYS THE PARTIES, ALL OF THE
PARTIES DO NOT CONSENT TO A MAGISTRATE JUDGE AND THAT WAY WE'LL
KNOW WHAT'S GOING ON.

BUT ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT WHOEVER HANDLES THIS CASE.

WHICHEVER JUDGE HANDLES THIS CASE, THERE ARE MATTERS THAT NEED

TO BE ADDRESSED TODAY.

THE FIRST ISSUE I WANT TO CONSIDER IS ON PAGE SIX OF
YOUR CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE STATEMENT. YOU SAY THAT KAM
AND KATZER ANTICIPATE THAT NEW PARTIES WILL BE ADDED. JACOBSEN
MAY ALSO ADD PARTIES TO THE CLAIMS AND I WANT TO PUT A CAP ON
THIS.

I DON'T WANT TO HAVE AMENDMENTS ADDING PARTIES ON THE EAVE OF TRIAL, FOR EXAMPLE. SO LET ME START WITH PLAINTIFF, HOW SOON WILL YOU BE ABLE TO MAKE THAT DETERMINATION?

MS. HALL: THE PARTIES WOULD BE -- ADD BRITTON IF YOU SO ORDERED, ASSUMING THAT YOU STILL WANT HIM IN, IF WE DECIDE WE DON'T WANT TO DECODERPRO.COM, POSSIBLY ROBERT BOWENS AND BOWENS ENGINEERING.

THE COURT: THAT'S A WHO, I WANT A WHEN.

MS. HALL: WHEN I WOULD FILE AN AMENDED COMPLAINT OR MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE AMENDED COMPLAINT, THERE ARE A COUPLE OF THINGS WE HAVE DISCOVERED.

THE COURT: I KNOW, I WANT A WHEN, NOW YOU'VE GIVEN ME A WHY?

MS. HALL: IT REALLY DEPENDENT ON WHAT YOU DECIDE TO RULE.

THE COURT: ONE SCENARIO IS YOU WILL HAVE TEN DAYS FROM THE ISSUANCE OF AN ORDER RESOLVING THE CURRENT MOTIONS.

MS. HALL: IF YOU ARE DECIDING THAT YOU ARE DISMISSING ANYTHING WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. TEN DAYS FROM ISSUANCE OF THE ORDER IN THE CASE OR 30 DAYS, WHICHEVER IS 30 DAYS FROM TODAY, WHICHEVER IS LATER.

MS. HALL: OKAY.

THE COURT: SO IF THE COURT HAPPENS TO DELAY ISSUING THE ORDER THEN YOU'LL HAVE MORE TIME.

WHAT ABOUT THE DEFENDANTS, CAN YOU MAKE THAT DETERMINATION IN THAT PERIOD OF TIME?

MR. JERGER: WE CAN DO IT THEN OR WE CAN GUARANTEE IT WILL BE IN OUR FIRST RESPONSIVE PLEADING, IF WE DO CHOSE TO ADD ANY PARTIES.

THE COURT: WHICH WOULD BE DUE WHEN?

MR. JERGER: ACCORDING TO WHAT I CALCULATED HERE 20
DAYS AFTER THE WRITTEN RULING, ASSUMING THERE IS NO AMENDED
COMPLAINT, OR 20 DAYS AFTER THE AMENDED COMPLAINT WE WOULD
EITHER FILE A RESPONSIVE PLEADING OR ANOTHER MOTION TO DISMISS.

THE COURT: IN ORDER TO ACCOMMODATE BOTH SIDES THAT
WILL BE THE ORDER OF THE COURT. IN THE FIRST RESPONSIVE
PLEADING I WILL EXPECT THE ADDITION OF ANY ADDITIONAL PARTIES
AT THAT TIME AND THE PLAINTIFF WILL HAVE LIKE AMOUNT OF TIME.

SO THAT ACTUALLY GIVES YOU MORE TIME, AND SO I'M GOING
TO VACATE WHAT I SAID BEFORE AND INDICATE THAT WHEN THE
DEFENDANT IS REQUIRED TO FILE ITS FIRST AMENDED PLEADING, WHICH

IN TURN WILL BE TRIGGERED BY THIS COURT'S ORDER, THE ISSUANCE OF THE COURT'S ORDER.

BY THAT TIME I EXPECT THE PARTIES TO ADD ANY

ADDITIONAL PARTIES THEY WISH TO ADD. SO THE MATTER, AT LEAST,

WILL PROGRESS TO THAT POINT. AND THAT ORDER BECAUSE THIS COURT

WILL ISSUE ITS ORDER, I GUESS, ONE THING I WANT TO SAY IS THIS.

THAT BY ASKING THE PARTIES TO CONSENT TO A MAGISTRATE

JUDGE, THAT DOESN'T MEAN THAT THIS COURT WILL NOT RESOLVE THE

MOTIONS BEFORE THE -- IT WILL BECAUSE IT WILL BE UNFAIR TO GIVE

THOSE DE NOVO TO A MAGISTRATE JUDGE, SO YOU CAN ASSURE YOUR

CLIENTS THE COURT WILL DO THAT.

THE PARTIES INDICATE THEY WILL FILE ANY MOTIONS FOR COURT ORDERS RELATING TO OBTAINING FOREIGN DISCOVERY AND TAKING FOREIGN DEPOSITION BY FEBRUARY 16TH, THAT'S THE PLAINTIFF'S PROPOSAL, DOES DEFENDANTS DISAGREE WITH THAT?

MR. JERGER: YES.

THE COURT: STOP. THEN I'M GOING TO LEAVE THAT TO THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE, EVEN IF YOU DON'T CONSENT, WILL DECIDE THAT. SO IF THERE'S NOT AGREEMENT I'M NOT GOING TO DEAL WITH IT AT THIS TIME.

WITH RESPECT TO THE DATES, THE DUELING SETS OF DATES,
THE ONE OTHER POINT WITH RESPECT TO NAMING OF NEW PARTIES, ONE
OF THE -- IF THERE ARE NEW PARTIES NAMED AND YOU HAVE
INFORMATION ABOUT ANY APPROPRIATE AFFILIATES OR THAT IF YOU
KNOW THEY HAVE COUNSEL YOU SHOULD LET THE COURT KNOW BECAUSE AS

THE PLAINTIFF POINTS OUT THE COURT WANTS TO KNOW THIS

INFORMATION, SO THAT ANY RECUSAL OR DISQUALIFICATION ISSUES

MIGHT BE ADDRESSED EARLY ON.

WITH RESPECT TO THE DUELING DATES I WANT TO SAY TWO
THINGS: THE FIRST THING IS, I WILL DEAL WITH THE -- BECAUSE
THE PARTIES DON'T AGREE I WILL BE SOLO NUMBER LIKE AND DECIDE
THE DATES AND PUT THEM IN MY ORDER WITH THE FOLLOWING
EXCEPTION, THAT WITH RESPECT TO THAT DETERMINATION WILL BE MADE
IN A LATER ORDER.

IN OTHER WORD, SHOULD THE COURT GET ITS ORDER OUT THIS WEEK THE DATES, THE ACTUAL DATES FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF THIS CASE ARE TO BE DONE BY THE JUDGE WHO'S GOING TO TRY THE CASE.

IF THE PARTIES CONSENT TO A MAGISTRATE JUDGE THE MAGISTRATE

JUDGE WILL DO THAT, WILL SELECT THOSE DATES.

AND I'M NOT GOING TO USURP THAT ABILITY TO MANAGE THE CASE OF THE JUDGE WHO'S GOING TO HANDLE IT. IF MY ORDER IS ISSUED BEFORE NEXT FRIDAY THEN I'LL DEAL -- AND THE PARTIES DO NOT CONSENT TO A MAGISTRATE JUDGE, THEN I WILL ISSUE A SEPARATE ORDER WITH THE DATES THAT WILL GOVERN THE COMPLETION OF DISCOVERY AND PRETRIAL AND FILING OF DISPOSITIVE MOTIONS.

AND IN THE FUTURE WHETHER THE PARTIES ARE BEFORE THIS
COURT OR A MAGISTRATE JUDGE IT WOULD BEHOOVE THE PARTIES TO
MORE COMPLETELY AND ADEQUATELY AND EFFECTIVELY MEET AND CONFER
WITH RESPECT TO DATES BECAUSE IT'S NOT THE COURT'S JOB, USUALLY
NOT THE BEST MANAGEMENT TO BASICALLY PICK DATES WHEN THE

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13 THANK YOU.

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15 (PROCEEDINGS ADJOURNED.)

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