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## Exhibit A

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is so revoked, then the cause of action lies in copyright. <u>See</u> David Nimmer, 3 Nimmer on Copyright § 10.02[B][5]. <u>See also I.A.E., Inc. v. Shaver</u>, 74 F.3d 768, 772 (7th Cir. 1996). It is an important argument in the open source software community, because, for instance, the GNU General Public License relies on license revocation to enforce its rights in copyright. However, the Court did not address the revocation argument. Plaintiff respectfully asks the Court to reconsider or address this argument, and issue the injunction.

In the alternative, Plaintiff asks the Court to restore the cause of action under § 17200 (see next section) and issue the injunction under § 17200. Toward the end of the Jan. 19, 2007 hearing, the Court asked counsel for Plaintiff if she agreed with the Court that if the Court found that the claim sounded in contract, Plaintiff was not entitled to an injunction. Counsel for Plaintiff responded by asking to issue the injunction under § 17200. If the claim sounds in contract, then Defendants committed an unlawful action by breaching the contract. See Watson Labs., Inc. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 178 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1120 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (unlawful practices prohibited under § 17200 include those prohibited by court-made law). Plaintiff, a competitor, has lost a property right – his rights under contract – through Defendants' misappropriation of Plaintiff's software, and Plaintiff seeks an injunction to remedy that loss. Under these facts, Plaintiff would be entitled to an injunction under § 17200.

## Section 17200

The cause of action under § 17200 should be restored. Defendants engaged in unlawful acts in violating the license. Plaintiff lost a property right as a result, and he seeks injunctive relief. A contract adds an extra element, and thus is not preempted under the Copyright Act. <u>Grosso v. Miramax Film Corp.</u>, 383 F.3d 965, 968 (9th Cir. 2004). Thus, the cause of action under § 17200 should stand.

## Cybersquatting

Plaintiff believes that a material difference in fact exists from the time of the hearing and when the court issued its ruling due to a disconnect between the Court and counsel for plaintiff. The Court dismissed the cybersquatting claim as moot because, as it stated, "counsel for Plaintiff contended that the cybersquatting claim is filed as an in rem action." Order at 5. Plaintiff has

sought the transcript of the hearing for the past few months and has been unable to obtain it, and thus cannot quote the section of transcript where the parties and the Court discussed cybersquatting. However, he and his counsel believe that his counsel did not represent the cybersquatting claim as in rem, but instead offered the Court this alternative to leaving the claim as it was: letting the cybersquatting claim stand if plaintiff did not seek the return of decoderpro.com in Jacobsen v. Katzer, and awarding attorneys fees and costs for a future in rem action, Jacobsen v. decoderpro.com, to be filed in Eastern District Virginia, where Network Solutions, the registrar for decoderpro.com, is located. When the court reporter provides the transcript, Plaintiff believes that the transcript will reflect that this was said. Thus, because of the UDRP decision in Plaintiff's favor, Mr. Britton is not a necessary party, and the cybersquatting claim should remain. Plaintiff asks the Court to reconsider this ruling, and restore the cybersquatting claim.

Respectfully submitted,

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